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INTRODUCTION
Corporations no longer exist in a purely commercial world.
Corporate policies intersect with and shape a host of political
issues, from fair trade to gay rights to organic farming to children’s development to gender bias to labor and more. Thus
Google urges countries to embrace gay rights; Mattel launches
a girl power campaign; activists question Nike’s labor practices,
McDonald’s food processing, and Shell Oil’s business practices;
and bloggers police the Body Shop’s claims about its manufac1
turing practices. The social, political, and commercial have
converged, and corporate reputations rest on social and political matters as much as, if not more than, commercial matters.
The proposition that corporations are people for First
Amendment purposes reveals that, if so, corporations are often
2
public figures. Like other public figures, corporations affect
public affairs, take political positions, engage in matters of public concern and controversy, and have reputations. A foundational commitment of free speech law, perhaps the foundational
commitment, is that public figures don’t and can’t own their
reputations. Yet through trademark and commercial speech
doctrines, corporations have powerful control over their reputa1. See infra note 177 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B.
2. This Article follows the logic of expanded speech rights for corporations to its conclusion. It shows that if such expansion is at hand, certain outcomes are required. Nonetheless, there are reasons to question whether such
an expansion is well grounded or wise. Several other authors have excellent
discussions of why corporations are different than individuals for speech and
other purposes. See C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial
Speech, 84 IND. L. REV. 981, 987–90 (2009) (arguing that commercial entities
are “created for . . . instrumental purposes” and have “a morally different status than living, flesh-and-blood people”); see also Patricia Nassif Fetzer, The
Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as First Amendment “Public Figure”: Nailing
the Jellyfish, 68 IOWA L. REV. 35, 65–69 (1982) (tracing the Supreme Court’s
different approaches to corporate personhood depending on the question presented); cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (connecting
the protection of someone’s good name to dignity). Ashutosh Bhagwat has
made a strong argument that the nature of an association matters for constitutional analysis of whether a corporate entity has speech rights. Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 1023–25 (2011). A corporate entity not engaging in associational speech should not be afforded the
same protection as one engaged in other speech, including commercial speech.
Id. Bhagwat defines associational speech as “speech that is meant to induce
others to associate with the speaker, to strengthen existing associational
bonds among individuals including the speaker, or to communicate an association’s views to outsiders (including government officials).” Id. at 981. As I argue, corporate commercial claims have become political, associational, and
commercial at the same time, which is why maintaining boundaries on corporate speech has become difficult.
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tions. If corporations are people for free speech purposes, as a
constitutional matter, their control over their reputations can
be no greater than the control other public figures have. Recognizing corporations as public figures has broad implications for
defamation, libel, trademark, and other corporate reputationprotection doctrines. These shifts achieve symmetry in the law
and ensure that speech rights are properly balanced. Corporations cannot have it both ways. Corporations want and receive
many of the same legal rights as natural persons. They should
be subject to the same limits as other powerful, public figures.
Part I of this Article establishes the nature of corporate citizenry and speech. Although Citizens United v. Federal Election
3
Commission is well-known as it relates to federal election law
and super PACs, its statements regarding the nature of corporations as persons and the scope of corporate speech rights are
equally, and perhaps more, important. Part I focuses on the
contours of First Amendment law and corporate speech as they
intersect to treat corporations as members of society engaging
in politics. I argue that economic decisions by corporations and
consumers have become influential to many political decisions,
and may be political decisions themselves, such that corporations of almost any size engage in politics. Combining the logics
4
of Citizens United and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, I show
that First Amendment law that grants corporations speech
rights also demands room for robust speech about corporate citizens as public figures.
Despite First Amendment jurisprudence and the publicfigure nature of corporations, certain laws squash critical
speech about corporations. Part II demonstrates how these
laws shield the reputations of public-figure corporations. First
Amendment jurisprudence makes decentralized authority a
5
virtue. This tenet prefers a wide range of information sources
and debate to help society question those in power and as a vital element of the political process. That is part of why reputation-protection doctrines meet constitutional challenges: such
doctrines erect barriers to questioning public officials and fig6
ures. Nonetheless, commercial speech and trademark doctrines limit information from many sources and protect reputa-

3.
4.
5.
6.

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.B.
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tions. The very premise that commercial matters, and by extension trademark law, are not political reveals the flaw. Once
deemed a matter of commercial speech, constitutional scrutiny
8
is lower. Currently, limits on the way people comment on and
criticize corporations are allowed because of the mistaken belief
that politics are not in play. A corporate public figure is, however, political. Just as we would not limit the ability to question
and identify human public figures for speech, we should not do
so for corporate public figures. But that is what the law enables.
For example, the factors that permit a corporation to bring
a dilution claim—national fame and being a household name—
track that “rare” creature in First Amendment law, the gen9
eral-purpose public figure. Dilution law, however, shields the
reputation of the nationally famous corporation. Thus, a nationally famous corporate person is treated differently than its
natural-person counterpart and may use that fame to quash
speech rather than having that fame open the door to more
speech about it. This result is at least perverse, and I argue it
is unconstitutional.
Trademark law’s confusion doctrine also favors a corporation’s speech about the corporation over other speech. Trademark law’s approach to reputation protection follows an overstated, narrow view that almost all speech not from the
corporation leads to reputational harm and consumer confu10
sion. When considered misleading commercial speech, critical
commentary involving trademarks is easily banned because
such speech receives less First Amendment protection than
noncommercial speech. Under this view, speech not from the
corporation is misleading and must be eliminated in the name
of protecting consumers from any confusion, even if consumers
are the ones trying to share information about the corporation

7. See infra Part II.B.
8. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
562–63 (1980) (“The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.” (citation omitted)).
9. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (“[T]ruly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. . . . Some occupy positions
of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for
all purposes.”).
10. See Mark McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 69 (2012).

Desai_MLR

2013]

SPEECH, CITIZENRY, AND THE MARKET

459

11

or its products and services. Instead of many voices questioning corporate public figures, society ends up with an impoverished ability to discuss and challenge them.
Given increased ability for speech by corporations, we need
to rebalance speech rules and increase our ability to speak
about corporations. I conclude that the logic of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence regarding corporate speech and public
figures requires that the law recognize a corporate public figure
doctrine. In Part III I set out what a corporate public figure
doctrine would look like in practice. I show that corporations
can often qualify as either general- or limited-purpose public
figures and address the implications of such a result.
The powerful, public, and political nature of corporations
demands that we ensure an increased ability to speak about
them. An ever-widening range of sources—newspapers, radio,
television, blogs, ratings sites, social media reviews, and
more—offers society numerous ways to understand and debate
any issue. Corporations vigorously use those resources to speak
and persuade society about corporate goods and services, political candidates, and social policies, and the Supreme Court has
ensured that they may do so. Yet laws protecting corporate
reputation interfere with anyone else’s ability to speak about
those same corporations. A corporate public figure doctrine
would allow increased speech about the corporation, provide
more information to both the political- and the consumerinformation marketplace, and reorder speech laws so that corporations have speech rights and obligations in balance with
natural persons.
I. SPEECH BY A CORPORATION: FROM CORPORATE
PERSONHOOD TO CORPORATE CITIZENRY
Citizens United provides a clear statement that, as far as
speech is concerned, the law affords corporations much the
12
same rights as people. An underlying, driving force in the
11. See McKenna, supra note 10, at 70 (“Indeed, courts routinely say that
trademark law targets ‘confusion of any kind.’” (footnote omitted)).
12. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010)
(“The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’” (citations omitted)); id. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. id. at 394 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is . . . the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a
speaker’s identity, including its ‘identity’ as a corporation.”). The law regard-
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analysis is that corporations are members of society that partic13
ipate in our democracy. This vision embraces the corporation
as engaging in public life, acting for political ends, and having a
reputation. If corporations seek to be recognized as participants
in society with commensurate speech rights, they are claiming
a type of citizenship, which we must understand. It turns out
that the nature of these citizens indicates they are often public
figures.
A. CORPORATE SPEAKERS
The Supreme Court has taken the broad approach that almost any corporation has speech rights in the eyes of the law. A
close reading of Citizens United reveals that the Supreme
Court believes that corporations have the same speech rights as
14
natural people. Given that the case was about a narrow question concerning what constitutes “electioneering communica15
tion,” and ostensibly was to resolve some incoherence in cam16
paign finance jurisprudence, it is odd that the Court went to
great lengths to discuss the First Amendment rights of corporations and the idea that corporations have the same speech
rights as people. Why the Court chose to reach beyond the narrow election law issue and whether that was the correct ap17
proach are good questions but are better explored by others.
Here, examining how the Court reached its conclusion about
corporate speech reveals the Court’s unwillingness to draw distinctions not only between corporations and people but also
among types of corporations.
None of the several possible objections to this result
worked for the Court. One could argue that corporations simply
do not have speech rights. Yet, as Justice Kennedy’s opinion
ing whether corporations have many, if not all, the same rights as people is
complex and changing. That debate will be important, but it is well beyond the
scope of this Article, which seeks to show the way the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and the current nature of corporations should affect corporations’ status as public figures.
13. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory
of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2004) (arguing that digital technologies require that freedom of speech promote a “democratic culture” that allows many to speak and participate in democracy).
14. See 558 U.S. at 319, 323–24, 343 (majority opinion).
15. Id. at 322–23.
16. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 588–90 (2011).
17. See, e.g., id.
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pointed out, “[t]he Court has recognized that First Amendment
protection extends to corporations,” and in political speech cas18
es that protection persists. One could argue that corporations
are not really part of political debates the same way people are.
To rebuff that position, the Court painted a picture of corporations as “contribut[ing] to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment
19
seeks to foster.”
For the Court, when it comes to speech, all corporations are
equal and can be important in the public sphere. The word corporation evokes images of large, profit-maximizing entities
with hundreds, if not thousands, of employees, worth millions,
if not billions, of dollars. Yet, a contention that only certain
corporations are important enough to have speech rights fails.
As Justice Scalia explained, the corporate form encompasses
many entities including “colleges, towns and cities, religious in20
stitutions, and guilds.” As with large, for-profit corporations,
one can appreciate the importance and role of these institutions
in society. Large or small, for-profit or non-profit, type of industry—none of these metrics matter. After all, the corporation at
issue, Citizens United, was a small, non-profit corporation with
21
“an annual budget of about $12 million.” Its income was based
22
on individual and some corporate donations. It was quite dif23
ferent than even number 500 on the Fortune 500, which had a
market capitalization of around $2.8 billion and $283 million in
24
profits in one year alone. Nonetheless, Citizens United was
characterized like so many “corporations and voluntary associations [that] actively petitioned the Government and expressed
their views in newspapers and pamphlets” since the beginning
25
of our country. That such a small entity does not map to the
possibly august stature and power of more familiar entities is
18. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342 (quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 n.14 (1978) (speech rights do not disappear “simply
because its source is a corporation”)).
19. Id. at 343 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal.,
475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
20. Id. at 388 (Scalia, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 319 (majority opinion).
22. Id.
23. See Fortune 500, CNN MONEY (May 23, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/full_list/401_500.html.
24. Fortune 500, Snapshot, CNN MONEY (May 23, 2011), http://money.cnn
.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/snapshots/927.html.
25. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 389 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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irrelevant. Just as the Court explained that “[t]he identity of
the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is
26
protected,” it layered in an idea that the type of corporation
does not matter. By conflating all corporations as being equal,
one can declare, “[T]o exclude or impede corporate speech is to
muzzle the principal agents of the modern free economy. We
should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this
27
speech to the public debate.” A small, political corporation is
the same as Apple, Exxon, Microsoft, IBM, Chevron, GE,
Google, and Wal-Mart. All corporations are now equally “the
28
principal agents of the modern free economy.” Thus we have a
picture of all corporations as having the same speech rights as
natural persons. We also start to see corporations as participants in public debate and vital parts of our political and economic life, which is a step toward recognizing the possible public-figure nature of corporations.
B. CORPORATIONS SPEAK ABOUT MATTERS OF PUBLIC
IMPORTANCE
Citizens United and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan asked
the same question: what are the limits when someone, corpo29
rate or otherwise, speaks about a public figure? The principles
offered in Citizens United trace back in part to Sullivan. On the
surface, Sullivan involved quite a different matter than Citizens United. Sullivan addressed “the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public
30
official against critics of his official conduct.” Citizens United
31
addressed speech by a corporate entity in an election context.
But both cases address corporate speech about a public figure.
As this chart shows, the factual parallels between Citizens
United and Sullivan are striking.

26. Id. at 342 (majority opinion) (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
27. Id. at 393 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 319–20 (majority opinion); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964). But see Baker, supra note 2 (arguing that corporations
are different than individuals).
30. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.
31. 558 U.S. at 318–19.
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Entity
Purpose
Object of
Speech
Accuracy
of Speech

Medium

Citizens United
Activist political entity (non-profit)
Advocate defeat of
candidate
Candidate for office
“[E]xtended criticism . . . . The narrative may contain
more suggestions
and arguments than
34
facts . . . .”
Pre-paid video on
demand: “The movie,
in essence, is a feature-length negative
advertisement that
urges viewers to vote
against Senator
Clinton for Presi36
dent.”

463

33

Sullivan
Press (for-profit); activist
political entity (nonprofit)
Highlight racial injustice/raise money
Public official
“It is uncontroverted that
some of the statements
contained in the paragraphs were not accurate
descriptions of events
which occurred in Mont35
gomery.”
Newspaper advertisement

32. Citizens United released a documentary film, Hillary: The Movie, critical of the then-Senator. Id. at 319–20. The corporation offered the film
through video-on-demand (VOD) services. Id. at 320. VOD can involve a fee
paid by individual viewers, or it can be offered free to the viewer. Id. Citizens
United chose to pay a cable distributor $1.2 million to carry the film as a VOD
option free to the cable company’s subscribers. Id. Because the film advocated
the defeat of a political candidate and the expenditure to allow the film to
reach people occurred within 30 days of the 2008 Presidential primary elections, concerns arose about whether Citizens United would run afoul of section
441b of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Id. at 321.
33. Sullivan involved a political entity using a mass communication medium to make assertions about a political matter and actor. The New York
Times had run an advertisement that was critical of actions taken by the State
of Alabama against protestors during the civil rights movement. Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 256–58. The advertisement listed several ways the State had acted,
including police actions. Id. The advertisement argued that these acts were
part of a “wave of terror” aimed at denying the civil rights of the protestors. Id.
at 256. The facts asserted were not always accurate, and the Times did not
check the facts. Id. at 258–61.
34. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 325.
35. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 258.
36. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 325.

Desai_MLR

464

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:455

Both cases engage with questions regarding the truth of speech
about public figures, the importance of speech about public
matters, whether the medium of speech matters, and whether
the identity of the speaker allows for limits on speech. Both entities addressed a political matter, called out behaviors by public figures, stretched the truth, were inaccurate in some instances, and used a paid form of mass communication to reach
an audience. And, both cases favored more speech and less protection for laws shielding the reputation of a public figure.
As a constitutional matter, the ability to criticize public of37
ficials trumps reputation protection and is to be fostered; the
medium of the message does not matter. The medium in Sullivan was a paid commercial advertisement in The New York
Times. When urged that the speech was not protected because
of the medium used, the Court ignored the medium and looked
to its content, which “communicated information, expressed
opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest
38
and concern.” In addition, the Sullivan Court advanced the
idea that not just the press, but anyone should be able to
39
“promulgat[e] . . . information and ideas” broadly. Prohibiting
something as creative as buying an advertisement to advance a
point of view would “shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure ‘the widest possible dissemination of infor40
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources.’” The Court favors enabling, not hindering, many voices, which can and
should use almost any means to reach as many people as possible, especially when those voices are new and challenging.

37. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264 (noting the claim for libel was “constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech
and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in
a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct”);
see also Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Story of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 252–55 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew
Koppelman eds., 2012) (tracing the later nuances of reputation protection by
the Supreme Court).
38. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id. The Supreme Court’s commitment to protecting mediums to allow
political engagement persists and is seen, for example, in Reno v. ACLU,
where the Court embraced the Internet as a way for anyone to become a “town
crier” or “pamphleteer” pressing his or her views to the world. 521 U.S. 844,
870 (1997).
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Even when criticism lacks accuracy or may be libel per
se—that is, words that “tend to injure a person[’s] . . . reputa41
tion” or “bring [him or her] into public contempt” —in political
42
matters, laws protecting reputation lose out. The tolerance for
speech, even speech that has inaccuracies or that challenges
opinions, is high because “public men, are, as it were, public
property, and discussion cannot be denied and the right, as well
43
as the duty, of criticism must not be stifled.” As with medi44
ums, the context of the message matters more than the label.
When facing a tradeoff between protecting reputation and possibly limiting debate on public issues, the debate “should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” even if that exchange “include[s] vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
45
attacks on government and public officials.”
Combining the logic of Citizens United with Sullivan allows for some observations. First, the provision of an outlet for
expression for those who may not have the same distribution
reach as the traditional press is necessary to permit the dissemination of a wide range of ideas and opinions, even, and
46
perhaps especially, those that challenge and “antagoni[ze]” us.
Second, corporations have broad speech rights. Like natural
persons, corporations can use all mediums, including paid advertisements in newspapers and video-on-demand services, to
47
reach the public about matters of public concern. Third, laws
that protect the reputation of or limit this ability to speak
about public figures are suspect and likely to be ruled unconsti48
tutional. Fourth, thus far in the analysis, corporations are the
speakers. The result is an explicit goal to expand commentary
41. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. at 269 (“[I]nsurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts,
breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various
other formulae for the repression of expression . . . can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations.”).
43. Id. at 268 (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263–64
(1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. (noting the Court will not give weight to the “mere labels” of state
law).
45. Id. at 270.
46. See id. at 266.
47. Cf. id. at 270 (finding a national commitment to fostering “wide-open”
debate on issues of public importance).
48. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 385 (2010)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Congress violates the First Amendment when it
decrees that some speakers may not engage in political speech at [certain]
time[s] . . . .”).
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on public affairs, including commentary by corporations. If
corporations can speak freely about public figures, corporations, just like natural people, may become public figures because of their speech and position in society.
C. THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTS AND PROCESSES
Corporations have gained speech rights, and the exercise of
those rights leads to obligations and limits on those rights. The
same politics and logic of privatization that have moved corporations to being at perhaps an apex of importance in our society
and politics demands that society have a greater ability to
question and probe corporations. Corporations touch vast areas
of individual and political life. As Justice Scalia has said, corporations are “the principal agents of the modern free econo50
my.” How individuals engage with the modern free economy
can also affect the politics of that economy, either indirectly or
51
through express political acts. This dynamic reveals a problem. Private market behaviors are supposed to “serve [an] expansive evaluative function,” but “consumers [must] receive an
informational context that is appropriately robust for the role
52
they are being asked to serve.” The Supreme Court has said
that we need to have an “unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
53
people.” It thus has championed many voices speaking about
public figures. That same reasoning applies when corporations
and their goods or services are where that political activity
takes place. When the Court acknowledged that consumer interest “in the free flow of commercial information . . . may be as
keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most
54
urgent political debate,” it seemed to separate commercial and
49. See id. at 364 (majority opinion) (“On certain topics corporations may
possess valuable expertise, leaving them the best equipped to point out errors
or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the speech of candidates and elected officials.”).
50. Id. at 393 (Scalia, J., concurring).
51. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
52. Douglas Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 535
(2004).
53. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
54. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 763 (1976). The Court reiterated this point in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977), and Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653, 2664 (2011).
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political information when in fact it captured the importance of
commercial information as political and connected to public de55
cision making. Such information allows people to know “who
is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at
56
what price.” The public interest at stake is enabling wellinformed decision making, based not only on price but on the
who and the why of production, so that “intelligent opinions as
to how that system ought to be regulated or altered” are possi57
ble. The Court connected commercial information to political
58
matters and how we order society. Thus, I argue that the distinction between commercial and political has collapsed so
much that the need to ensure a high flow of information about
corporations and their goods and services is great, regardless of
the label on such information. Furthermore, just as distinctions
between public figures and public officials make no sense, as
policy is no longer set through “formal political institutions” but
through “a complex array of boards, committees, commissions,
corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected
59
60
with the Government,” so too for corporations. Distinctions
between human public figures and corporate public figures
make no sense. Recognizing corporations as public figures increases safeguards that ensure information about these important actors will be available to society.
The public, political debates by and about corporations, the
nature of manufacturing, and the effect of purchasing decisions
indicate that corporations may qualify as public figures or be
part of a discussion of public concern more often than one
61
might expect. If so, rules that impose liability or damages
62
without fault are not allowed by the Constitution. A possible
objection to corporations being treated as public figures is that
they are private and their work is not about matters of public
55. We protect commercial information not because it enables economic
efficiency in the marketplace, but because it is relevant to public decision making in a democracy. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 39–40 (2012).
56. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
57. Id.
58. Id. (“[A]llocation of our resources in large measure will be made
through numerous private economic decisions.”).
59. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163–64 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
60. See Fetzer, supra note 2, at 63 (noting corporate influence closely resembles “public sectors of power”).
61. See infra Part III.A.
62. POST, supra note 55, at 11.
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63

concern. And yet from Citizens United, one has a vision of corporations as often fully engaged in public debate with “voices
that best represent the most significant segments of the econ64
omy.” Objections that corporations are private miss the point.
Private, natural people may become public figures. Any person
who is a public official involved with public affairs “runs the
risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case,”
and a private figure may be a public figure subject to similar
65
scrutiny. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the seminal case regarding a private individual—that is, someone not elected or
appointed to public office—being deemed a public figure, the
Supreme Court set out the key question: one must examine
whether the person “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into
a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public
66
figure for a limited range of issues.” The Court’s description of
the characteristics and ways in which someone becomes a public figure shows why some corporations are likely to be seen as
public figures:
For the most part those who attain [public figure] status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are
deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed
as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
67
involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.

This description of general-purpose public figures seems to
foreshadow Justice Scalia’s proclamation about the general importance of corporations almost forty years later.
Furthermore, corporations can distribute their messages in
ways that matter for constitutional analysis. In Gertz, the
Court relied on public figures’ “significantly greater access to
the channels of effective communication and hence . . . more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private
63. Cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
762 (1985) (granting a business credit report “no special protection” when the
speech was “solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its business
audience”); Deana Pollard Sacks, Snyder v. Phelps: A Prediction Based on
Oral Arguments and the Supreme Court’s Established Speech-Tort Jurisprudence, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE•NOVO 418, 426–27 (noting that private matters are of “reduced constitutional value” and receive less “First Amendment
protection from tort liability”).
64. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 588 U.S. 310, 354 (2010).
65. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–45 (1974).
66. Id. at 351.
67. Id. at 345.
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individuals normally enjoy” to support the idea that public fig68
ures must be subject to more, not less, speech about them.
Corporations often have access and resources to counteract any
speech about them that may be false or troubling. In United
States v. Alvarez, the Court recently addressed a regulation of
false speech and struck it down in part because four Justices
believed that “the dynamics of free speech, of counterspeech, of
69
refutation, can overcome [a] lie.” Justice Breyer’s concurrence,
which Justice Kagan joined, acknowledged the power of more
70
accurate information to “counteract the lie.” Alvarez saw average citizens’ ability to engage in counter-speech as enough
power to combat a lie. Given corporations’ concentrated wealth,
newfound power to create super PACS, and ability to employ
sophisticated public relations and communications campaigns
either through in-house or hired companies, corporations can
rival, if not exceed, the access many human political figures can
afford. In other words, corporations can engage in counterspeech as needed and so can meet the counter-speech criteria
71
for being a public figure.
Connecting Citizens United and Gertz shows that corporations can be general-purpose public figures easily and, short of
that, often can be limited-purpose public figures. This chart
helps illustrate the connection.

68. Id. at 344.
69. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (plurality opinion).
70. Id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., concurring).
71. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 909–10 (2000) (noting a corporation’s
ability to engage in counter-speech supports treating the corporation as a limited-purpose public figure under Gertz).
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Entity

Gertz
Person

Citizens United, the
entity, as possible
public figure
Corporation

Public or Private

Private

Private

Prominence in Society

Yes

Yes

Thrust to forefront for
particular controversy
in order to influence
the resolution of the
issues involved

No

Yes

Significantly greater
access to media
General Public Figure
Limited Public Figure

No

Yes

No
No

No
Yes

It is the use of speech rights that matters. In expanding
corporate speech rights, the Supreme Court has not differenti72
ated between national and smaller, unknown corporations.
Just as with natural persons, all corporations may speak. And
just as with natural persons, a corporate speaker who is not a
general-purpose public figure may become a limited public figure through its participation in society and exercise of speech
73
rights. For example, Citizens United was not a public figure
74
in general; it would, however, have met the limited-purpose
public figure criteria. Citizens United certainly “thrust [itself]
to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to in75
fluence the resolution of the issues involved.” Citizens United,
the corporate person, used its resources to “enjoy significantly
72. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354–
56 (2010) (holding that the expenditures ban unconstitutionally silences both
non-profit and for-profit organizations, as well as corporations both large and
small).
73. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351 (noting one becomes a limited-purpose public figure by “injecting [one]self . . . into a particular public controversy”).
74. At the time of the Citizens United decision, Citizens United, the corporation, was not a household name and lacked prominence in society.
75. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
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greater access to the channels of effective communication” as
it partnered with cable services to offer an expensive video-on77
demand (VOD) version of its communication. Any corporation
can engage in similar behaviors. As such, one can see that corporations can often become limited public figures.
In addition, the Court addressed whether a corporation’s
ability to influence the resolution of an issue could be restricted
78
in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. There the Court further cemented a corporation’s ability to speak and influence matters, as it
protected corporate speech even if its marketing was more per79
suasive than other speech. Corporations use their greater resources to speak and persuade, and the Supreme Court blesses
such activity just as it would for individuals. That many corporations may behave as and qualify as public figures, especially
when they choose to speak, seems clear. But when someone
speaks about corporate public figures, the question of when a
corporation or its practices are the subject of public concern
arises.
The way society makes and uses goods can influence the
80
81
global marketplace and has political implications. That is
why we need to be able to speak about corporations as much as
corporations are allowed to speak about whatever they wish to
speak. What we buy, what we use, how we make, and how we
82
use have moved beyond pure, personal cost evaluations. Today the idea that purchasing choices are “purely private con83
cerns” is less clear and often inaccurate. Even when a corpo76. Id. at 344.
77. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320 (noting Citizens United was to pay
$1.2 million to make the VOD programming available at no extra charge to
the viewer).
78. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011).
79. Id. (“Absent circumstances far from those presented here, the fear
that speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it.”).
80. See
Kysar,
supra
note
52,
at
529
(explaining
that
“[g]lobalization . . . has enhanced the flow of information, not merely goods,
and information regarding processes increasingly is finding its way downstream”); id. at 641 (noting that consumers are responding accordingly, since
“consumer preferences may be heavily influenced by information regarding the
manner in which goods are produced”).
81. See Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 393,
438 (2002) (“[C]onsumption patterns may identify one as a liberal, moderate
Republican, radical feminist, or born-again Christian.”).
82. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
83. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
759 (1985).
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ration is not the direct, obvious provider of a governmental service, the move toward making markets a key way in which we
organize society blurs, if not eliminates, the line between the
public and private nature of corporations. Corporations are major political and economic actors. Consumers are voting for policy through the market and “may well come to view such preferences as their most appropriate mechanism for influencing the
84
policies and conditions of a globalized world.” Not all corporations will qualify as public figures, and not all business processes will qualify as public concerns. Matters of purely private
85
concern will remain subject to less speech protection. Yet,
consider questions about diamond-mining practices, child labor
issues, oil drilling methods, food-production methods’ effect on
86
health, and corporate outsourcing policies. Corporations’ role
in these matters is precisely why Justice Scalia was correct in
his assessment about the importance of corporations in socie87
ty. Furthermore, corporations often embrace environmental,
organic, fair-trade, fair-labor, or other positions as part of their
88
overall image as corporate citizens. They also lobby on all
manner of regulatory matters related to the way they conduct
their respective businesses. These issues are of public con89
cern.
Given consumer activism and the greater ability to share
information about a good and whether to purchase it, corporations and consumers face increased claims about whether exercising a purchasing choice is wise or good from a political point
of view. For example, the locavore movement focuses on eating
90
food grown within 100 miles of where one lives. It also tries to
84. Kysar, supra note 52, at 535.
85. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759 (“[S]peech on matters of
purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”).
86. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO (2002) (arguing corporations
and their brand strategies have political implications).
87. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2311, 2315 (2009) (“[M]arks now express—whether implicitly or explicitly—
environmental, human rights, and labor characteristics, as well as classic
health and safety standards . . . .”).
89. See infra notes 284–94 and accompanying text.
90. Margot Roosevelt, Local-Food Movement: The Lure of the 100-Mile Diet, TIME, June 11, 2006, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1200783,00.html. See generally Pallavi Gogoi, The Rise of the
‘Locavore’, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 20, 2008), http://www
.businessweek.com/stories/2008-05-20/the-rise-of-the-locavorebusinessweek
-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (detailing the rise of the local food movement, which Gogoi defines as food grown within 250 miles of
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reduce fossil fuel use in growing and delivering food. The
movement is connected to sustainability goals and issues, but
some debate the movement’s effectiveness for environmental
92
goals. Regardless, the shift has changed the way people and
companies such as Google approach buying and consuming
93
food. Even the paper-or-plastic question of fifteen years ago is
not as simple today. Some consumers may believe that paper is
better than plastic for the environment but face evidence that
one is merely choosing between two products that are harmful
94
to the environment. The potential options don’t stop there.
95
What about biodegradable plastic bags? Perhaps compostable
bags are the best choice? Some believe that bring-your-own-bag
(BYOB), i.e., using a reusable bag, is the best environmental
96
choice. Cities, counties, and even states may pass laws banning certain materials or levying a charge for use of one mate97
rial over another. Companies making the bags lobby about
what is the correct choice. Companies, such as Whole Foods,
may choose one option before a law is passed to signal a com-

where one lives).
91. Gogoi, supra note 90 (noting concern over “food miles” and “carbon
footprints”).
92. Compare Vasile Stanescu, “Green” Eggs and Ham? The Myth of Sustainable Meat and the Danger of the Local, 8 J. FOR CRITICAL ANIMAL STUD. 8,
8 (2010) (arguing that the locavore movement needs to be “reunderstood and
rearticulated”), with Kathy Rudy, Locavores, Feminism, and the Question of
Meat, 35 J. AM. CULTURE 26, 26 (2012) (offering a “qualified endorsement of
local eating”).
93. See, e.g., Marion Nestle, What Google’s Famous Cafeterias Can Teach
Us About Health, THE ATLANTIC, July 13, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/
health/archive/2011/07/what-googles-famous-cafeterias-can-teach-us-about
-health/241876/ (noting how Google’s food program is “designed to promote . . .
environmental values”).
94. See, e.g., Anne Thompson, Paper or Plastic—What’s the Greener
Choice?, NBC NEWS (May 7, 2007 7:37 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
18538484/ns/nightly_news/t/paper-or-plastic-whats-greener-choice/
(stating
paper bags create more air pollution, while plastic bags produce more solid
waste).
95. See, e.g., BusinessGreen, Europe Considers Plastic Bag Ban, GUARDIAN ENVIRONMENT NETWORK (May 20, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://www.guardian.co
.uk/environment/2011/may/20/europe-plastic-bag-ban (distinguishing between
plastic bags that will biodegrade naturally and those that will not).
96. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 94.
97. See, e.g., David Zahniser & Abby Sewell, L.A. OKs Ban on Plastic Bags
at Checkout, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/
24/local/la-me-0524-bag-ban-20120524 (noting that Los Angeles is the largest
city to pass such a ban, while San Jose, San Francisco, Long Beach, and Santa
Monica already have such bans in place).
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98

mitment to a political ideal. News outlets report on the mat99
100
ter, as do online sources. Some statements challenge beliefs
101
and claims about bags. Food production and recycling are but
two areas where commerce, corporations, and politics intersect.
For example, energy, health care, “Made in the U.S.A,” birther
claims, and marriage equality have all been part of public battles where activists across the political spectrum have urged
102
consumers to vote with their dollars.
The jurisprudence that demands increased corporate
speech rights also mandates increasing the ability to speak
about corporations when they exercise those rights. Several
doctrines, however, limit speech about corporations and act as
reputation shields. In essence, when the corporation, rather
than a natural person, is the subject of speech, it is allowed to
98. See A Better Bag, WHOLE FOODS MARKET, http://www
.wholefoodsmarket.com/mission-values/environmental-stewardship/better-bag
(last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (noting that reusable bags are the “eco-nomical” option).
99. See, e.g., Jane Black, Plastic Bags Headed for a Meltdown, WASH.
POST, Feb. 6, 2008, at F1.
100. See, e.g., Paper vs. Plastic—The Shopping Bag Debate, GREENFEET
BLOG (Feb. 25, 2009, 2:51 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/20120125030733/
http://blog.greenfeet.com/index.php/paper-vs-plastic-the-shopping-bag-debate/
reducing-your-footprint/121 (accessed by searching for original URL in the Internet Archive index).
101. Compare Myth: Paper Is Better than Plastic, REUSEIT.COM, http://web
.archive.org/web/20130208060558/http://www.reuseit.com/learn-more/myth
-busting/why-paper-is-no-better-than-plastic (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (accessed by searching for original URL in the Internet Archive index) (challenging the contention that paper is better than plastic), and Do Plastic Bag Bans
Help the Environment?, NPR (Jun. 5, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/
2012/06/05/154354092/do-plastic-bags-bans-help-the-environment (noting that
with bag choice, “everything is [a] tradeoff[]”), with Top 10 Myths About Plastic Grocery Bags, AM. PROGRESSIVE BAG ALLIANCE, http://www
.plasticsindustry.org/files/about/fbf/myths%2Bfacts_grocerybags.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (highlighting trade group’s claim about plastic bags’ impact
on environment).
102. See, e.g., Justin Gillis, To Fight Climate Change, Students Aim at
Portfolios, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at B1–B2 (energy); Janean Chun, John
Metz Denny’s Obamacare Surcharge Stirs Big Mess for Restaurant Chain,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2012, 9:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/11/20/john-metz-denny’s-obamacare-surcharge-_n_2146735.html (health
care); Tim Cuplan, Foxconn Plans American Expansion as Clients Seek Made
in U.S.A., BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6, 2012, 10:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-12-06/foxconn-plans-american-expansion-as-clients-seek-made-in-u
-s-a-.html (made in the U.S.A.); Nate C. Hindman, At ‘Dump the Trump’ Macy’s Rally Sparks Fly, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://
huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/21/trump-macys-dump-the-trump_n_2170136
.html (birther claims); infra notes 299–304 and accompanying text (gay marriage and same-sex rights).
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save face, which it should not be allowed to do.
II. SPEECH ABOUT THE CORPORATION: AGAINST
SAVING CORPORATE FACE
A cluster of laws and doctrines protects corporate reputation despite the constitutional desire for more speech about
public figures. The Lanham Act favors reduced speech about
corporations and raises barriers to speech based on the idea
that distortion is a harm to be prevented. Part of the problem is
that the subject matter of corporate reputational laws is traditionally understood as a type of commercial speech, which re103
ceives less protection than other speech. That position underestimates the way in which these laws also act as reputationprotection laws. For example, trademarks have moved far beyond the commercial sphere. Trademarks have become brands;
that is, they now are more about allowing corporations to protect reputation and persona than preventing unfair competition
104
and advancing consumer protection.
Precisely because
trademarks have become reputation devices, trademark law
105
runs into constitutional speech problems. In fact, corporate
reputation doctrines reach conclusions that run contrary to the
Supreme Court’s speech jurisprudence. We do not question and
hamper the ability of a critic to challenge a public figure. We
do, however, question and limit the ability to critique a corporate public figure. When choosing between saving corporate
face and the right to speak about a corporation or its goods and
services, the right to speak should trump.

103. POST, supra note 55, at 41.
104. See, e.g., Dan Burk & Brett McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 361 (2009) (noting that a trademark is a reputational asset).
105. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks
as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 398 (1990)
(noting the “Constitution . . . favor[s] public access to the tools of expression,”
which include trademarks); Laura Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651,
715 (2009) (arguing that trademark law deserves First Amendment protection); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark
Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381, 381 (2008) (stressing that “[t]rademarks consist of
language”).

Desai_MLR

476

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:455

A. THE NATURE OF CORPORATE FACE
Corporations have a being; it is their brand and all that
goes with it. A corporation’s word mark is its given name—its
106
logo, its face. Google, Mattel, and Rolex can be the names of
political figures just as Hillary Clinton, Mitt Romney, and
Barack Obama are names of political figures. The bitten apple,
interlocked Gs, and golden arches can be the faces of political
figures just as pictures of George W. Bush and Bill Clinton cap107
ture the faces of political figures. Beyond these familiar aspects, corporations see themselves not only as people but as
having identities, personalities, and souls personified by their
108
brands. Corporations speak of injury to their reputations in
much the same way people refer to reputational injuries in li109
bel. This self-perception conforms to corporations’ claims to
greater recognition as people in the speech context and elsewhere. Like a person, corporations seem to assert:
He hath disgraced me, and hindered me half a million; laughed at my
losses, mocked at my gains, scorned my nation, thwarted my bargains, cooled my friends, heated mine enemies; and what’s his reason?
110
I am a [Corp.].

as they wage campaigns against those who might use their
marks and logos to criticize.
106. See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982
WIS. L. REV. 158, 198 (“Famous trademarks are the functional equivalent of
famous names . . . [a trademark] functions as the visual ‘likeness’ of its incorporeal owner as well.”).
107. Cf. id. at 195–96 (“Famous trademarks offer a particularly powerful
means of conjuring up the image of their owners, and thus become an important, perhaps at times indispensable, part of the public vocabulary.”).
108. See, e.g., MARCEL DANESI, BRANDS 33 (2006) (explaining that brands
are personalities with identities); cf. CELIA LURY, BRANDS: THE LOGOS OF THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 24, 33–34 (2004) (discussing brand personality as reflecting
the internal connection between the brand and employees who become “the
soul” of the brand, as well as reflecting consumer needs).
109. Despite corporations’ greater ability to claim personhood, they do not
have the same dignity interests as people, and thus the issues at stake for a
person bringing a libel claim are not the same as for a corporation. See generally Baker, supra note 2. Baker summarizes the argument that “respect for
individual autonomy does not require protecting the speech of artificially created and instrumentally valued commercial entities.” Id. at 990. I argue here
that those reasons are being ignored or are eroding so that corporate reputation claims are starting to function like dignitary interests.
110. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 3, sc. 1; see also
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (“But he that filches
from me my good name Robs me of that which not enriches him, And makes
me poor indeed.” (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3)).
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Like Shylock, corporations seek revenge. Like Sullivan,
corporations seek to prevent speech about their public roles and
acts. Mattel may be the most notorious example of such behaviors. In two cases, Mattel went after uses of Barbie that depict112
ed the icon in ways to which Mattel objected. The artists
113
commented on Barbie and on society’s view of women. Although the cases came out in favor of the speech, the defendants
114
spent the equivalent of millions of dollars defending the suits.
Mark holders also try to shut down consumer gripe sites, sites
115
that criticize the corporation behind the mark. Tactics include sending cease-and-desist letters to “wear down” critics
and taking advantage of the “disparity” in legal skills between
116
the corporation and the critic. Some have called these behav-

111. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 3, sc. 1 (“[A]nd
if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?”). The rest of Shylock’s speech asks
whether he, a Jewish man, does not have eyes, hands, organs; is not subject to
the elements; would not laugh if tickled, bleed if pricked; just as any other
Christian and impliedly any other person. Id. Corporations as of yet do not
have such capabilities, but they can and do seek revenge. See, e.g., Steve
Silberman, Mattel’s Latest: Cease-and-Desist Barbie, WIRED, Oct. 28, 1997,
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/1997/10/8037 (reporting that a
Mattel attorney allegedly claimed the company wanted a defendant’s house);
cf. Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1839–42 (2007) (addressing abusive trademark litigation spawned by policing requirement); K.J. Greene, Abusive
Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doctrine—
Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 631–38 (2004) (examining instances of abusive
trademark litigation); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1045–46 (2005) (discussing the damages
available to trademark and other intellectual property holders for misuse of
their intellectual property).
112. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir.
2003) (criticism of Barbie by juxtaposing a nude Barbie and various kitchen
appliances); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002)
(reference to Barbie in a song by the band Aqua).
113. See Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d 792; MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894.
114. The artist in one case sought expenses and fees of $1.6 million after
prevailing. Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 815.
115. Jonathan L. Schwartz, Making the Consumer Watchdog’s Bark as
Strong as Its Gripe: Complaint Sites and the Changing Dynamic of the Fair
Use Defense, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 59, 70–72 (2006); Hannibal Travis,
The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus that the First Amendment
Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1,
3–5 (2005).
116. Schwartz, supra note 115, at 71–72.

Desai_MLR

478

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:455

117

iors trademark bullying. In the case of the small artist and
Mattel, only pro bono representation made the defense possi118
ble.
After an appeal and remand the defendants won an
award of “$1,584,089 in attorney’s fees and $241,797.09 in
119
costs.” Despite that victory, the overall result is incorrect.
The tactics match the ones at issue in Sullivan: “There is no
doubt that these Southern officials were hoping to use libel law
120
to curb press coverage of the civil rights movement.” The
claims in Sullivan totaled $3 million, the claims against the
New York Times for other reporting on Birmingham were for
another $3.15 million, and the press in general faced close to
121
$300 million in potential libel damages. The Court recognized
122
that the suits were chilling speech. By using cease-and-desist
letters and strategic lawsuits that, even when decided correctly, impose terrifying costs, mark holders generate the sort of
123
chilling effects First Amendment doctrine seeks to remove.
Like natural people, corporations claim personal rights but
do not wish to be subject to appropriate limits on those
124
rights.
Rather than having many sources for information
about a corporation, a corporation prefers to be the central and
only source of information about the corporation and not to be
125
criticized. That ideal, however, runs contrary to the Supreme
117. See, e.g., Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS.
L. REV. 625; Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853 (2012).
118. The artist in the case was represented by the ACLU. See Walking
Mountain, 353 F.3d at 795.
119. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., No. CV99-8543RSWL(RZX),
2004 WL 1454100, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2004).
120. Papandrea, supra note 37, at 237.
121. Id.
122. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300–01 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result).
123. See Lidsky, supra note 71, at 859–61 (examining how corporations use
defamation suits to chill speech, especially by those without resources to defend against such suits).
124. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21–22 (Ticknor & Fields, 2d
ed. 1863) (noting the way in which people invoke the government as vindicating or interfering with rights depending on the issue and perspective rather
than following a general principle).
125. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Parody as Brand 10–11
(Stanford Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2,170,498, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2170498##. A tradition of clearing rights and aggressive
suits against those who use intellectual property in ways rights holders dislike
undermines First Amendment protection for many creators. See Jennifer E.
Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L.
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Court’s preference for more, not less, speech about public figures.
Once corporate reputation laws enter the picture, an imbalance in corporate speech law emerges. Imagine telling Citizens United, the entity, that it could not speak about thenSenator Clinton or, if allowed to speak, could not in any way
mislead or be aggressive in its claims, let alone use thenSenator Clinton’s name or face to deliver the political message.
Corporate reputation laws open this possibility all too easily
126
when it comes to speaking about the corporation. None of
which is to say these laws ignore speech entirely. Rather, they
have a narrow view of speech and fail to accommodate it well.
B. BARRIERS TO SPEECH ABOUT PUBLIC-FIGURE CORPORATIONS
The traditional lines between commercial and noncommercial speech, between corporation and person, and be127
tween private and public are gone. Nonetheless, threats to
speech about public-figure corporations persist. For example,
trademark law was once separate from constitutional concerns,
because trademarks were easily understood as commercial
speech. In essence, commercial speech is speech that proposes a
128
commercial transaction.
Such speech—if truthful, nonmisleading, and about lawful activity—can be regulated as long
as the regulation serves a substantial government interest, directly advances that interest, and is no more extensive than
129
necessary to serve that interest.
Noncommercial speech,
however, “even if false, can only be regulated under much more
REV. 1899, 1911–16 (2007). Even major studios pay high fees to identify and
clear rights and to obtain expensive errors and omissions insurance, regardless of First Amendment defenses. Id. at 1915–16. Documentarians and individual filmmakers face the same costs and often forego use of and references
to famous people (because of the right of publicity), copyrighted material, and
trademarks, because otherwise the film cannot be made. Id. The culture forces
requesting permission, which is the opposite of what should happen when public figures and concerns are at hand.
126. Lidsky, supra note 71, at 945 (“[P]owerful corporate plaintiffs will use
libel law to intimidate their critics into silence and, by doing so, will blunt the
effectiveness of the Internet as a medium for empowering ordinary citizens to
play a meaningful role in public discourse.”).
127. This point has greater force today, but the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the issue for First Amendment analysis since at least 1967. See
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163–64 (1967).
128. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
129. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980).
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130

limited circumstances.” Thirty years ago Robert Denicola asserted, “The information conveyed through the use of a trademark generally relates not to the momentous philosophical or
political issues of the day, but rather to the details of prospective commercial transactions—the source or quality of specific
131
goods or services.” Thus, limits on commercial speech were
132
considered “exempt from constitutional scrutiny.”
When
Denicola wrote about trademarks and speech, he faced unsettled “doctrine and policy” regarding the justifications for
trademark protection including a growing turn to a property
approach to trademarks, as seen in stronger misappropriation
133
and dilution theories of trademark. The ideas of corporate
speech were nowhere near as developed as today, yet he already saw that “trademark law must ultimately respond to
134
basic constitutional interests.”
Given expanded trademark
protection, expanded corporate speech, and the politics of products and processes, the world of 1982 is gone, and the concerns
motivating Denicola thirty years ago have come to fruition.
These concerns have converged and provide corporations
135
with a speech advantage. Today the information conveyed
through a trademark often concerns the political issues of the
130. Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation,
58 S.C. L. REV. 737, 738 (2007) [hereinafter Tushnet, Trademark Law].
131. Denicola, supra note 106, at 158–59; accord Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“[T]rademark law . . . ‘reduce[s] the
customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ . . . for it
quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with
this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items
that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.” (alteration in original) (quoting 1
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:01[2] (3d ed. 1994)); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987) (arguing that trademarks are justified as promoting economic efficiency).
132. Denicola, supra note 106, at 159.
133. Id. at 160, 172, 183. But see Ramsey, supra note 105, at 395 (differentiating between protection doctrines for trademarks as commercial speech and
trademarks as noncommercial speech).
134. Denicola, supra note 106, at 160.
135. Corporations are sensitive to speech protection imbalances when they
hinder corporate ability to advance a message. One understanding of the recently decided Kasky v. Nike, Inc. case, 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003), is a claim that “it was unfair that Nike’s critics
could say almost anything, subject only to the lax constraints of defamation
law, while Nike’s responses were subject to strict liability for falsehood.” Rebecca Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle: The First Amendment, Fairness, and Corporate Reputation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1457, 1465 (2009) [hereinafter Tushnet,
Fighting Freestyle].
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day, especially when considering source and quality of goods
136
and services. A paradox arises here because of the idea of
137
trademark law as consumer-protection law. In the political
realm, the scale tips to more information, even inaccurate information, as the foundation for rich debate and, over time, informed decision making. In the commercial realm, speech is
limited, in part because it is not seen as being on par with political speech, and in part to limit information to accurate and
true statements that enhance the marketplace and, arguendo,
138
consumer welfare. Often the law does not protect untruthful
speech, and the First Amendment allows laws that limit speech
as a way to “insur[e] that the stream of commercial information
139
flows cleanly as well as freely.” In words that seem to echo
trademark law’s likelihood of confusion test, the Supreme
Court has said, “[T]here can be no constitutional objection to
the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately
inform the public about lawful activity. The government may
ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public
140
than to inform it.” Trademark law arguably protects consumers by removing misleading speech and improving information
141
in the marketplace.
A presumption here is that truth in
commercial contexts is easier to find and offer than in political

136. See Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981,
1039–40 (2012) (discussing anti-branding and political actions based on corporate policies).
137. See, e.g., Burk & McDonnell, supra note 104, at 352 (“[T]rademark law
contains a substantial component of consumer protection . . . .”).
138. Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544–45 (2012) (plurality opinion) (discussing distinctions in false statement of fact cases and their
value to society).
139. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976); see Tushnet, Trademark Law, supra note 130, at
737–38.
140. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (emphasis added).
141. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 413, 414 (2010) (“When it works well, trademark law facilitates the
workings of modern markets by permitting producers to accurately communicate information about the quality of their products to buyers . . . . If competitors can falsely mimic that information, they will confuse consumers, who
won’t know whether they are in fact getting a high quality product. Indeed,
some consumers will be stuck with lemons.”). For some, the claim is that when
it comes to passing off in trademark, the consumer is ill-equipped to protect
herself. See Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1, 20 (1992).
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142

contexts. Commerce is also presumed to be apolitical; often it
is not. Speech rules from Citizens United and Sorrell unfetter a
corporation’s ability to speak about political stances and the
politics of their products. The shift allows corporations to use
aggressive and pervasive advertising across the full range of
media, such as television, radio, the Internet, mobile displays,
billboards, infomercials, and print, to achieve their goals. At
the same time, a corporation would prefer not to have others
use the same means to criticize them. Current laws about corporate criticism play right into this strategy, as they hinder the
ability to use speech to question and police corporations.
For example, dilution law explicitly protects corporate reputation; yet, as I argue, a corporation qualifying for dilution
protection is also a public figure, and as such dilution claims
are constitutionally prohibited. Dilution protects famous
143
marks. Federal dilution law defines famous marks as marks
“widely recognized by the general consuming public of the
United States as a designation of source of the goods or services
144
of the mark’s owner.” It is a reputation law that seeks to
145
eliminate “blurring” or “tarnishment” of the mark. Uses that
may transfer recognition from one realm to another are prohib146
ited unless coming from the mark holder. Factors indicating
that a mark is famous include amounts spent and areas
reached by advertising, how much and where goods and ser147
vices have been sold, and the extent of actual recognition.
This language comes from a recent revision, which was designed, in part, to move away from dilution protection for
“niche” marks, or locally famous marks, and make dilution pro142. Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and
Commercial Speech Doctrine, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK
OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 294, 312 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) (noting that with political speech we “presume a fully rational
citizen,” but those opposed to regulation “presume a careful and competent
consumer,” whose conduct is “plainly inconsistent with the behavior of idealized speech-evaluators”); Richard H. Weisberg, The First Amendment Degraded: Milkovich v. Lorain and a Continuing Sense of Loss on Its 20th Birthday,
62 S.C. L. REV. 157, 179–80 (2010) (arguing a proper reading of Sullivan accepts a thinking, deliberating audience).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012).
144. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
145. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 564 (2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, Gone
in Sixty Milliseconds].
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
147. Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds, supra note 145, at 514.
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tection only available for national brands that have “household”
148
recognition.
Perhaps to the surprise of corporations that lobbied for dilution protection, marks meriting dilution protection corre149
spond to general corporate public figures. A human is “a general purpose public figure only if he or she is a well-known
celebrity, his name a household word. . . . They are frequently
so famous that they may be able to transfer their recognition
150
and influence from one field to another.” A corporation that
qualifies for dilution protection is, like a human general public
figure, by definition nationally or “widely” known like a “celebrity,” a “household” name, and its recognition and influence—
what dilution law calls “fame”—is easily applied to many
151
realms. Unlike the way the law treats human public figures,
dilution law is a shield for the corporate public figure. The essence of a dilution claim is that, unlike confusion-based trademark doctrines, holders of famous marks can sue junior users
“regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confu152
sion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.” The classic
rationale that regulation of false or misleading speech is allowed evaporates with dilution, for dilution does not require
that the speech deceive or confuse consumers and never even
153
asks whether it was false. As part of dilution’s reputationprotection structure, an act that may transfer recognition from
one realm to another—a criteria that tips toward allowing more
speech about a natural person—is prohibited. As Rebecca
Tushnet has argued, dilution law enables mark holders “to sta148. See Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark
Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J., 1143, 1157–
58 (2006).
149. See Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality of Dilution, 11 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 212, 214 (2012) (“Properly viewed, the federal dilution statute is
a legislative precursor to the type of corporate personification underlying the
Supreme Court’s analogous treatment of corporate speech under the First
Amendment in Citizens United and is equally misplaced.” (footnote omitted)).
150. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 772 (1987) (en banc) (quoting
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory
of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 117 (2009).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012). Federal dilution law has been revised
since its initial passage in 1995. Under the revision, a claim may still only be
brought by the holder of a famous mark, but the junior user’s use must be
“likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous
mark” for there to be a remedy under the cause of action. See id.
153. See Tushnet, Trademark Law, supra note 130, at 738.
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bilize the meaning of a mark,” rather than face the “robust
competition in the marketplace of ideas” the First Amendment
fosters, and it “favors meanings approved by established pro154
ducers above meanings offered by challengers.” This image
protectionism is exactly the opposite of what First Amendment
law requires when a public figure is at stake.
Dilution law fails to accommodate the criticism that should
be possible for a public figure. Federal dilution law lists some
exemptions for certain types of speech, such as fair use, com155
parative advertising, and news commentary. The exemptions
seem to enable commentary this Article seeks to foster, but do
not go far enough. First, plaintiffs often bring state dilution
claims as part of their lawsuits, but the Act does not reach
156
state dilution laws and trademark infringement claims. Second, the exemptions simply do not cover what they should, and
analysis ends up asking traditional, fact-intensive trademark
law questions, such as whether the use was for the defendant’s
goods or services or to designate source in a confusing manner,
murky issues regarding whether a parody was properly made,
and difficult questions of fair use, rather than focusing on the
criticism and commentary inquiries needed for speech about
157
public figures. In one case the use of Louis Vuitton marks to
make and sell a handbag-styled, plush chew toy for a dog was
158
deemed a parody and allowed. In contrast, when Hyundai
used Louis Vuitton marks in a television advertisement by altering the mark to LZ and placing the altered mark on a basketball that appeared for one second in a thirty-second commercial, the court found that Hyundai had diluted the Louis
159
Vuitton mark. Hyundai claimed it was using the mark to
comment on the changing meaning of luxury, and the commercial showed ironic images challenging what luxury means, such
as “policemen eating caviar in a patrol car; large yachts parked
beside modest homes; . . . [and] an inner-city basketball game
160
played on a lavish marble court with a gold hoop.” That did
154. Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds, supra note 145, at 561.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
156. See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 49, 106–07 (2008).
157. See id. at 108–09; Rierson, supra note 149, at 212.
158. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252
(4th Cir. 2007).
159. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor America, No. 10 Civ.
1611 (PKC), slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).
160. Id. at 2.
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not matter. Hyundai was not able to meet the fair use exemption, because it was not commenting solely on Louis Vuitton,
161
and there was intent to use the mark. The inquiry incorrectly
focused on intent to misappropriate the mark rather than asking whether the use was to make a false statement about the
company—an inquiry that would allow the speech instead of
162
preventing it. And, a more general problem appears. As one
commentator has put it, the exemptions make the analysis
“ambiguous” and thus defeat the goal of increased speech, because the hurdles put us in a world of late case resolution and
163
uncertainty about liability —the opposite of what we should
want if we are to be able to question corporate public figures.
Trademark law encounters further problems as it tries to
protect consumers from false and misleading speech. A core
understanding of trademark law today is that its purpose is to
“facilitate the transmission of accurate information to the mar164
ket.” But the source of that transmission is the mark hold165
166
er. Mark holders, not consumers, bring trademark suits.
The idea is that the mark holder will police its mark, and consumers benefit as a result. In the rare cases where there truly
is passing off—using a mark to deceive consumers about what
167
they are buying—trademark law protects consumers, and the
concerns of this Article are not present. As a constitutional
matter, the ideal of protecting consumers by preserving the
161. Id. at 14–15.
162. Cf. Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 119 (2010)
(“[T]here was no evidence of any intentional collusion to misappropriate plaintiffs’ identities.”).
163. McGeveran, supra note 156, at 109; accord Rierson, supra note 149, at
267–68 (noting that even where parody is found, “courts must engage in a factspecific weighing of factors in these types of cases to determine whether the
use will ‘impair the distinctiveness’ of the famous trademark or harm its reputation,” and finding parody is “not a foregone conclusion” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 265)).
164. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2006) (emphasis added).
165. Desai, supra note 136, at 985.
166. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012); cf. BeVier, supra note 141, at 21 (“[I]f a
consumer’s interest in not being deceived by a passer-off is going to be protected at all, it will have to be by . . . . the owner of the trademark.”).
167. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, Response, An Information Approach to
Trademarks, 100 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2130 (2012); Ariel Katz, Beyond Search
Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks, 2010 BYU L. REV.
1555, 1570–71. But see McGeveran, supra note 156, at 68 (“The test has expanded far beyond its roots in cases involving direct commercial competitors.”).
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quality of information in the marketplace appears sound, but
when probed the ideal falls apart.
The current system allows the object of the speech to control the content of that speech, which is a backwards result for
public figures. We would not allow Sullivan or Hillary Clinton
to dictate whether and how people could comment on them as
public figures. Yet, trademark law relies on mark holders to decide when the public should be able to see or hear an opinion
about the mark holder. As with the defamation suit at issue in
Sullivan, trademark law enables threatening letters and law168
suits that chill speech. Trademark enforcement practices, including sending cease-and-desist letters and increasing numbers of “strike suits” designed to force quick settlements, are
“standard practice in the face of virtually any use,” even legal
169
uses. If a case reaches a court, the test applied—the likelihood of confusion test—asks whether the use in question is
“likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association” between the plain170
tiff and defendant or their products. The test is, however,
171
quite poor at accommodating speech. The multifactor test is
fact-extensive, requires experts, and is rarely amenable to
172
summary judgment. In addition, because trademark law embraces consumers as dullards who are easily confused when
173
purchasing, almost any hint of confusion, even in expression
174
cases, can be found to be an infringing use. The Lanham Act
is subject to a broad reading, and courts grant injunctions with
a small showing or belief that some use of a mark “indicate[s] a
trademark owner’s mere approval of a defendant’s product or
175
service.” Confusion analysis thus chills speech “regardless of
176
the ultimate outcome.”
168. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 105, at 404 (discussing examples of such
enforcement actions).
169. McGeveran, supra note 156, at 64.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
171. See generally Ramsey, supra note 105 (arguing that First Amendment
scrutiny should apply when trademark law chills speech).
172. McGeveran, supra note 156, at 71.
173. See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 887 (2004) (“[O]rdinarily prudent consumers have
also been characterized as ‘credulous,’ ‘inexperienced,’ and ‘gullible.’” (footnote
omitted) (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:93 (4th ed. 1996))).
174. See generally McGeveran, supra note 156 (discussing cases and proposing a fair use statute for trademarks).
175. Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trade-
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Another speech problem occurs when commercial and noncommercial speech mix. In Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, after allegations
that Nike “mistreat[ed] and underpa[id] workers at foreign facilities,” Nike engaged in a campaign to protect its image, including taking out advertisements, issuing press releases, writing op-eds, and sending letters to university presidents and
177
athletic directors, some of its main constituents or customers.
Kasky, a private citizen, claimed Nike had made false and misleading statements about its labor practices and sued Nike for
178
unfair and deceptive practices under California law. Despite
all the advertising and marketing efforts in its campaign, Nike
argued its speech was noncommercial, because it did “more
than propose a commercial transaction” and was related to
more than just “economic interests of the speaker and its audi179
ence.” Nike claimed it was engaging in a general public de180
bate and offering its “opinion on matters of public concern.” If
accepted, Nike’s speech would have come under the heightened
scienter required before one can find tort liability for such
181
speech.
Yet Nike’s communication was an advertisement,
concerned a product, and had an economic motivation, and thus
182
arguably fit the definition of commercial speech. If so, Nike
was making a statement about its products, not general labor
issues, and one could limit Nike’s commercial speech and factual statements while still allowing Nike to speak about general
183
politics. This view ignores, however, that many people buy
goods based on politics. To say that Nike’s speech was not political is incorrect. As Justice Breyer explained in his dissent, Nike was responding to claims about “a matter that [was] of sigmark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1313 (2011) [hereinafter Tushnet, Running the Gamut].
176. McGeveran, supra note 156, at 71.
177. 539 U.S. 654, 656 (2003). The Supreme Court decision was a dismissal
of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted but offers insights about the
problems of commercial speech doctrine. See also Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d
243, 248 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003); accord Erwin
Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What Is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not
Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143, 1148 (2004).
178. Nike, 539 U.S. at 656.
179. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 177, at 1149 (footnote omitted) (quoting Brief for the Petitioners at 22, Nike, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
180. Id.
181. Kysar, supra note 52, at 575 n.215.
182. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 177, at 1147–48 (citing Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983)).
183. Id. at 1148–50.
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nificant public interest and active controversy” and where ad184
vocacy for action had been made. Nike’s speech was simultaneously commercial speech and political speech, with the two
185
aspects “inextricably intertwined.”
The political nature of commerce indicates that a corporation should be allowed to speak, but allowing someone to police
that speech through lawsuits would be disfavored. Justice
Breyer claimed the choice was binary, between First Amendment protection only for truthful commercial speech and the
First Amendment commitment to protecting “the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern” as
well as creating “breathing space” for speech on matters of public concern, including “potentially incorporating certain false or
186
misleading speech.” The tradeoff is the familiar one from Citizens United: truth testing or more speech on public matters.
Breyer sided with more speech. He indicated a statute that allows an individual to bring a suit for false advertising when the
individual has suffered no harm would be unconstitutional, be187
cause the threat of such suits would chill corporate speech. He
further questioned the general idea of a private attorney gen188
eral being able to go after mixed political speech. Breyer noted that such a law would handicap commercial speakers—often
189
corporations—in ways noncommercial speakers were not.
Although Justice Breyer’s analysis is consistent with the idea
that laws favoring less speech are likely unconstitutional, it
highlights that, yet again, corporate speech is protected, while
avenues to challenge corporations are closed.
Like other public figures, corporations need policing. Consumers may wish to take up causes and go after corporations in
court, but regulations allowing consumers to police corporate
190
speech are few and suspect under the Court’s views on restricting corporate speech. All that remains to discipline a corporation is speech about the corporation. That solution, however, reveals the asymmetry of commercial speech law when a
184. Nike, 539 U.S. at 677 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185. Id. (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S.
781, 796 (1988)).
186. Id. at 676.
187. Id. at 679–80.
188. Id. at 681.
189. Id.
190. See Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle, supra note 135, at 1460 (noting California changed the law to “preclude future Kaskys” from bringing such suits,
and few states allow such suits).
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consumer tries to talk about a corporation. Speech about a corporation is often subject to greater, not less, regulation, because
of the conceit that the subject matter is less important than
non-commercial speech. Justice Breyer recognized a potential
harm of having a private attorney general being able to go after
191
mixed political speech, but given that corporations are the
private actors bringing trademark suits, they too are private
attorneys general who may go after mixed speech about them.
Again, corporations receive the benefits of speech, but without
the limits placed on natural persons. Corporations speak with
almost no limits. Corporations may use reputation laws to
thwart speech about corporations. And, lawsuits to hold corporations accountable for their assertions are not allowed. The
confluence of these results narrows the number of speakers
about a corporation. The Supreme Court’s speech jurisprudence, however, favors “decentralization”—reducing barriers to
speech about public figures and increasing the number of decentralized sources of information, not limiting them.
C. THE VIRTUE OF DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY
Decentralization is supposed to help society have more perspectives—even false or distorting ones and especially critical,
challenging ones—so that debate can take place. Corporate
reputation laws, however, work to limit the numbers of speakers about a corporation in the name of advancing truthful
192
speech. That position is untenable when considering a publicfigure corporation. Citizens United examined the truth-value of
speech as a question of distortion—“the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
193
ideas.” The truth-value of speech arises in Sullivan as both
194
factual-error and defamation issues. Taken together, these
cases show that First Amendment law not only tolerates turbulence about issues and possibly confusing statements from myr191. Nike, 539 U.S. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
193. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 348 (2010)
(quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
194. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (“If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional
shield from criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two elements is
no less inadequate.”).
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iad sources about public figures and/or public matters, but also
embraces that muddiness as a way to have a larger debate that
195
is not subject to only one view of an issue. Put differently, the
Court seeks to increase the amount of information and puts
196
less weight on the information’s truth-value.
The possibility of a speaker, corporate or otherwise, being
so powerful as to distort speech simply does not matter in the
decentralized approach to speech. Citizens United rejected the
concept of antidistortion in favor of allowing more, not less
speech. Antidistortion was designed to prevent corporations
“from obtaining ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’ by using ‘resources amassed in the economic market197
place.’” That a corporation may amass great wealth and use it
is not a surprise. Mitigating such a possibility might even be
laudable. But individuals can also amass similar wealth, and
198
the First Amendment does not turn on financial status. Furthermore, the Court noted that the antidistortion ideal would
apply to a media corporation and allow Congress to ban such a
199
corporation’s speech. According to the Court, “By suppressing
the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and viewpoints
from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons
200
or entities are hostile to their interests.”
Thus, the
antidistortion rule, if followed, would deny corporations the
right to speak in the same way that individuals speak and be
tantamount to censorship that prevents the public from receiv201
ing information. Such a rule could not stand. In the face of
virulent factions, banning one or the other faction “destroy[s]
195. As shown later, this point clashes directly with the way trademark
law operates and has large implications for speech and trademark law. See infra pp. 140–42.
196. Cf. Desai, supra note 167, at 2127.
197. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 313 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 659); see
also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011).
198. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–52 (“The First Amendment’s protections do not depend on the speaker’s ‘financial ability to engage in public discussion.’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976))).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
201. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting “enforced silence” in favor of more speech to counter false
statements); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (“The censorship we now confront is vast in its reach. The Government has ‘muffle[d] the voices that best
represent the most significant segments of the economy.’ And ‘the electorate [has
been] deprived of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function.’”
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
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the liberty” of some factions and is “worse than the disease.”
It is better to have more speech by all manner of speakers and
203
let the public determine “what is true and what is false.” All
of these points fit into the view that the solution to possibly distorting views is to have all speak rather than have a centralized decision about what speech to allow.
The antidistortion approach to speech was doomed for another reason: the Court’s high tolerance for false, inaccurate
statements in the realm of political speech. The antidistortion
perspective may be correct that certain corporate views could
overwhelm other speakers’ voices and possibly eliminate precisely the wide range of speech the Citizens United Court
vaunted. Antidistortion principles also sought to manage the
way in which large corporate donations can corrupt the political
204
process. The perspective that certain corporate speech will be
false and distort the factual record cannot, however, get around
Sullivan. Recall that Sullivan involved a claim of libel and left
205
the defendants with truth as a defense. The Court resoundingly rejected truth testing in favor of speech. When the First
Amendment is at issue, “any test of truth—whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials—and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker”
206
is not recognized. Such tests would force the speaker to assess and prove the truth of statements; that endeavor, even for
true statements, presents great uncertainty and potential costs
such that speakers would self-censor for fear of actions and
207
possible judgments against them. Truth matters, but under
the actual malice standard set forth in Sullivan, a defendant
must speak “with knowledge that [the publication] was false or
208
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” This
standard permits a huge range of speech by punishing only the
most egregious false statements. Such a standard accommo202. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354–55 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10,
at 130 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961)).
203. Id. at 355.
204. Id. at 447 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the majority “badly errs both in explaining the nature of [anticorruption, antidistortion, and shareholder protection] rationales, which overlap and
complement each other, and in applying them to the case at hand”).
205. See supra note 34 (discussing the facts of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
206. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271.
207. Id. at 278–79.
208. Id. at 279–80.
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dates the fact that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free
209
debate.” The standard also ensures that “constitutional protection [for speech] does not turn upon ‘the truth, popularity, or
210
social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.’” Furthermore, “[i]njury to . . . reputation,” even if based on “utterance[s] contain[ing] ‘half-truths’ and ‘misinformation,’” is not
211
sufficient to trump speech about public officials. The Sullivan
Court, like the Citizens United Court more than 45 years later,
championed the ability of anyone—corporation, association, or
individual—to criticize public officials (and by extension public
figures) and discuss public affairs. Rules that interfere with
that ability are likely unconstitutional.
At the same time, the Court’s free speech jurisprudence reflects a dedication to a type of symmetry when considering
what speech is allowed and how speech is made. Sullivan recognized that public officials have broad immunity against libel
212
if the statement is made as part of the official’s duties. In a
move to rebalance speech rights, the Sullivan Court held that
“[i]t would give public servants an unjustified preference over
the public they serve, if critics of [public officials] did not have a
fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials them213
selves.” Justice Goldberg’s concurrence in Sullivan adds another dimension to this symmetry. The underlying logic seems
to be that if the press was able to smear the public official, and
the official had little ability to counter that speech, a distortion
214
problem may be present. That was not the case, because public officials have sufficient means for counter-speech through
215
the media. Because there was symmetry regarding speech
platforms, there should be “an absolute privilege for criticism of
216
official conduct” by citizens and the press. Citizens United
and Sorrell also rejected rules that distinguish amongst speak209. Id. at 271.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 272–73.
212. Id. at 282 (recognizing “the utterance of a federal official to be absolutely privileged if made ‘within the outer perimeter’ of his duties” (quoting
Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959))).
213. Id. at 282–83 (emphasis added).
214. See id. at 304–05 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result).
215. Id. (arguing that even in the face of “unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate misstatements,” a public official should and could engage in counterspeech because she could avail herself of her “equal if not greater access than
most private citizens to media of communication”).
216. Id. at 304.
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ers and instead favored applying the same speech rules to all.
One way to understand Citizens United’s rejection of the
antidistortion ideal is as a peculiar form of symmetry. The
Court adhered to the idea that all manners of speech in all mediums are equal, and its discussion of the way in which any and
all speakers may soon avail themselves of a range of mediums,
including the Internet, tracks a desire to avoid carve-outs for a
specific type of speaker or medium and instead treat all the
218
same. For the Court, the possibility of all having the same options to speak is more important than whether one speaker
may be better at, or have more powerful ways of, using those
options.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Alvarez supports the idea that even when faced
with false statements of fact that involve misuse of a powerful
symbol—the Medal of Honor—corrective counter-speech is fa219
vored over restricting speech. The parallel to the interests
advanced for dilution and trademark confusion claims was
220
strong. In those areas, however, if a plaintiff can show a dilution or a likelihood of confusion when another uses the plain221
tiff’s mark, harm is presumed and an injunction is issued. In
contrast, not only did Justice Kennedy reject the general position “that false statements receive no First Amendment protec222
tion,” he rejected the claim that the government interest in
protecting the integrity of the award—not “dilut[ing] the value
217. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 353–54 (2010).
218. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350–52, 364 (“There is no precedent
supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between corporations which are
deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are not.”).
219. Both the opinion by Justice Kennedy, which three Justices joined, and
the concurring opinion by Justice Breyer, which one Justice joined, look to
more information and corrective speech as better ways to solve inaccurate
statements than bans on false speech. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.
2537, 2549 (2012) (plurality opinion); id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Statutes prohibiting trademark
infringement present, perhaps, the closest analogy to the present statute.”).
Justice Breyer makes the connection between trademark law and the case but
conflates confusion doctrine and dilution doctrine.
221. See, e.g., Sandra L. Rierson, IP Remedies After eBay: Assessing the
Impact on Trademark Law, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 163, 164 (2008) (“In
trademark law, like patent law (at least prior to the eBay decision), the case
law reflects a strong presumption that injunctive relief goes hand-in-hand
with a finding of liability—either in the form of trademark infringement or,
more recently, dilution.”).
222. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (plurality opinion).
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and meaning of military honors,” and not letting misuse tarnish the symbol—was sufficient to overcome the interest in free
223
speech. For Kennedy, the claimed harm—protecting the symbol’s value and reducing public confusion about the symbol—
224
lacked connection to the remedy. Instead of the restriction on
speech like that which trademark law fosters, Alvarez looked to
counter-speech and better information sources for people to
check potentially false statements as ways to cure the possible
225
confusion and harm the false use of the symbol might create.
Yet corporate reputation doctrines are asymmetrical to,
and reach different conclusions for, the same questions the
Court addresses in public figure speech cases. The following
chart illustrates the divergence in treatment.
Antidistortion/
Politics
No

Confusion/Commerce
Law
Yes

Reputation
Protection

No

Yes

Allows
Muffling of
Voices

No

Yes

Tolerance for
Inaccuracy

Yes

No

Truth Test

The very doctrine that the Supreme Court rejects—the
226
antidistortion doctrine—because it “muffle[d] . . . voices” and
“deprived [the electorate] of information, knowledge and opin227
ion vital to its function,” reappears in trademark law under
the guises of dilution and likelihood of confusion doctrines. Only here the roles are reversed. The corporate speaker is privileged and shielded from scrutiny as it presses its views about
223. Id. at 2545–49.
224. Id. at 2549.
225. Id.; id. at 2560 (Alito, J., dissenting).
226. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010)
(quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 257−58 (2003)).
227. Id. (quoting United States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106,
144 (1948)).
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itself, while everyone else faces hurdles to speak. Like the
world before Sullivan, the public figure is protected and has
superpowers, whereas the speaker is unprotected and faces
229
penalties for speech. Instead of relying on the more powerful
speaker to use its resources for counter-speech, challenging
speech is simply quashed. Beyond the traditional speech rules
under which people operate, corporations use trademark law to
protect their name, face, and reputation. Trademark law privileges the mark holder’s view of its mark and the information
the corporation offers for processing its version of the truth
over others’ and suppresses challenges to what the mark stands
for lest those challenges confuse consumers, even in cases
230
where the “protection doesn’t protect consumers.” This position makes little sense for speech about a corporate public figure.
If corporations are afforded the same speech rights as and
against individuals and across all mediums, individuals should
have the same rights against corporations. Given corporations’
important role in society as speakers, as shapers of our world,
and as influencers of politics, the law should allow for more discussion about corporations’ business practices, goods, and services—not less. As between a corporation’s access to media and
ability to present a message on an issue and an individual’s, a
corporation often has greater access to the media to respond—
not less. Yet glaring areas of the law undermine, if not negate,
the ability to speak about corporations. These laws protect corporate reputation and interfere with the Court’s commitment to
speech symmetry. They favor a corporation’s speech about its
goods, services, and the corporation itself while suppressing
other speech about the corporation. They embrace
antidistortion principles, rather than rejecting them. If the
principles of decentralized provision of information—including
information about political matters, regardless of some inaccu228. Accord Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds, supra note 145, at 56
(“Dilution is a doctrine that favors meanings approved by established producers above meanings offered by challengers. . . . [To] the extent that truthful
commercial speech promotes democratic values, [it is] antidemocratic.”).
229. Cf. Tushnet, Trademark Law, supra note 130, at 749 (“[I]f it is true
that commercial speech is as relevant and vital to modern citizens as political
speech, then suppressing competition is analogous to silencing political opponents and certainly merits skepticism. Like partisan officials deciding which
political speech to pursue, trademark owners may see harm where there is only competition.”).
230. Tushnet, Running the Gamut, supra note 175, at 1360.
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racies, and matters related to corporations—are to have force,
laws that protect corporation reputation have to be rethought.
III. ESTABLISHING THE CORPORATE PUBLIC FIGURE
DOCTRINE
Public-figure jurisprudence should shape the way we govern commentary about corporations. Thus, I propose a corporate public figure doctrine. Dissolving lines about what is commercial speech, expanding corporate power to stop speech, and
shrinking ways to police corporations demand increased speech
about corporations and lead to one conclusion: we need a safe
harbor for speech about corporations. A corporate public figure
doctrine provides the contours of such a safe harbor. Such a
doctrine creates the possibility for more speech about corporations and rebalances free speech law so that corporate speech
rights are subject to the same obligations and limits as the
speech rights of natural persons.
A. INCREASING SPEECH
A corporate public figure doctrine would ensure high information flow and public debate about the politics of com231
merce. How much information we allow into a debate involves an inherent tradeoff. First Amendment law and
corporate reputation law strive to balance between judgment
calls about what is good information that allows us to make
better decisions, and bad information that hinders our ability to
232
understand an issue. Corporate reputation law tends to limit
information and privileges corporations as sources of infor233
mation. First Amendment jurisprudence favors the provision
of more information by individuals, groups, and the press and
relies on the ability of people to parse amongst different pieces
of information, even inaccurate information, instead of restrict234
ing information flow. The First Amendment’s actual malice
231. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
503–04 (1984) (“The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak
one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto
itself—but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of
society as a whole.”).
232. Cf. POST, supra note 55, at 34 (“Democratic legitimation requires that
the speech of all persons be treated with toleration and equality. Democratic
competence, by contrast, requires that speech be subject to a disciplinary authority that distinguishes good ideas from bad ones.”).
233. See supra Part II.A.
234. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (“But to
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test reflects the choice for more information, not less. Actual
malice requires that the defendant knew the publication was
false or made with “reckless disregard of whether it was false
235
or not.” Given the passions involved in political and public issues, the standard requires something more than “ill will or
236
‘malice’ in the ordinary sense of the term.” It does not matter
that the allegedly defamatory material is published with an eye
237
toward profit. The core issue is whether the defendant “made
the false publication with a ‘high degree of awareness of . . .
probable falsity,’ or must have ‘entertained serious doubts as to
238
the truth of his publication.’” Thus it seems that most assertions about a public-figure corporation would be privileged un239
less someone offered an outright lie and knew it was a lie.
The Lanham Act is the missing piece of corporate reputation doctrine, where applying actual malice runs into problems
but should not. Indeed, the actual malice threshold has been
applied to limit some corporate reputation doctrines. Trade libel and slander of title actions—sometimes collectively known
240
as injurious falsehoods —have been held constitutional when
limited to cases involving knowingly false statements and a
insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is
essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as
well as true ones.”).
235. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
236. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666
(1989).
237. Id. at 667 (“If a profit motive could somehow strip communications of
the otherwise available constitutional protection, our cases from New York
Times to Hustler Magazine would be little more than empty vessels.”).
238. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74
(1964); St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 730).
239. Alvarez, however, points to a preference for corrective speech rather
than a ban, even when an outright lie is the issue. United States v. Alvarez,
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (plurality opinion). Lyrissa Lidsky has argued
that the standard undermines actual malice’s power when applied to nonmedia defendants and offers the opinion that privilege is an alternative defense for non-media speakers. See Lidsky, supra note 71, at 915–18. Relying
on fact and opinion distinctions means that the gross, hyberbolic statement is
protected and misstatement of fact, a key part of what Sullivan protected, is
lost. See Weisberg, supra note 142, at 183. Reliance on the fact-opinion distinction reverts the law to the pre-Sullivan era and demands truth-testing. Id.
Truth-testing is part of the way that current corporate reputation laws thwart
speech. Applying actual malice to corporate public figures allows the sort of
aggressive claims and misstatement of facts at issue in Sullivan and Citizens
United and avoids the truth-testing problems the opinion inquiry raises. It also maps to the idea that the audience is able to sort statements to find the
truth. See id.; infra notes 312–17 and accompanying text.
240. See 2 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 13:1.1 (4th ed. 2011).
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241

showing of actual malice. Actual malice is the threshold for
liability in a trade libel case involving a public figure under the
Restatement of Torts, and Judge Sack offers it as the probable
242
requirement in his treatise on First Amendment law. Applying actual malice standards to trademark and false advertising
law would track how the Court manages other corporate reputation doctrines. The section of the Lanham Act that addresses
false advertising “creates a cause of action strikingly similar to,
and that may act as a substitute for, one for injurious false243
hood.” The section concerning trademarks uses almost the
244
exact same language as the false advertising provisions. Yet
trademark and false advertising law are treated quite differently than other corporate reputation laws, with injunctions being
common, no intent requirement for deception, and no require245
ment for special damages related to the speech at issue. These doctrinal results directly conflict with how we treat public
figures. They work to protect corporate public-figure reputation
rather than to allow society to scrutinize them as it might any
other public figure.
The use of actual malice standards when speaking about
corporate public figures allows consumers, commenters, the
press, and others to engage in unfettered speech about corporations. This approach rebalances the current system, which favors expanded, barely restricted corporate speech but limits
speech about corporations. Such an approach could arguably
place all corporate speech beyond the reach of not only much of
trademark and false advertising law, but also agencies that
246
regulate corporate speech. In that sense, Rebecca Tushnet
identifies precisely the problem this Article tries to address.
241. See, e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1057–58 (9th Cir.
1990) (trade libel); SCO Group, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296
(D. Utah 2010) (slander of title); see also Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh
and James Weinstein as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, United
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210).
242. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. d (1977); 2 SACK,
supra note 240, § 13:1.4 (“A public plaintiff probably must, under the First
Amendment, prove ‘actual malice’ in a disparagement case as in a libel or
slander case.”).
243. 2 SACK, supra note 240, § 13:2.
244. See Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle, supra note 135, at 1475 n.82 (“[T]he
language barring falsity and misleading representation is the same in the
statute, and courts have interpreted both provisions to require a showing of
likely deception.”).
245. See 2 SACK, supra note 240, § 13:2.
246. Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle, supra note 135, at 1479.
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Current Supreme Court jurisprudence seems to go to the heart
of commercial speech and consumer protection ideals and eviscerates them in favor of more speech and corrective speech by
247
all. I am not saying this turn is necessarily desirable, and I
248
acknowledge its problems.
Rather, I believe that First
Amendment jurisprudence has gone this route. This shift requires that we offer proper protection for those who would
speak about corporate practices. When increased speech is all
that remains, barriers to such speech should be torn down.
B. ENABLING SPEECH ABOUT THE CORPORATE PUBLIC FIGURE
A few hypothetical situations help illustrate how a corporate public figure doctrine would operate. Suppose Corporation
A (CA) is a leading maker of tractor equipment. CA’s tractors
may be used for a variety of purposes. On the one hand, customers may use the tractors to increase their farms’ yield and
reduce labor needs to allow for investment in costlier but more
249
environmentally friendly farm techniques.
On the other
hand, some customers may use the tractors to tear down for250
ests, fill in wetlands, or remove settlements. Now consider
Corporation B (CB), a leading maker of toys for girls. CB’s doll
is the most popular doll for girls. On the one hand, the doll is
part of a campaign for girl power and has promoted positive careers, from surgeon to fashion designer to producer to an Afri251
can-American female Presidential candidate. On the other
247. See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is:
Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 227, 257 (2007) (“[T]he consequence of turning false advertising law into
a subtopic of First Amendment law would be a substantial, possibly near-total,
contraction of its scope.”).
248. Cf. id. (“[A]dvocates of full constitutional protection for commercial
speech need to explain what they mean when they say that commercial fraud
would still be actionable in their proposed constitutional regime.”).
249. Cf., e.g., Code of Conduct: Environment and Sustainability, CATERPILLAR,
http://www.caterpillar.com/company/strategy/code-of-conduct/
commitment/environment-and-sustainability (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (“We
strive to create stockholder value by providing customers with solutions that
improve the sustainability of their operations.”).
250. See, e.g., Blake Sobczak, Caterpillar Pulled from Social Indexes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 27, 2012, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
caterpillar-pulled-social-indexes (describing Israeli military’s use of “armorplated Caterpillar bulldozers to raze Palestinian houses”).
251. See, e.g., Simone Brummelhuis, Career Barbie (Now 50) Is on a Mission and Advocates Girl Power, THE NEXT WOMEN (March 29, 2009), http://
www.thenextwomen.com/2009/03/29/career-barbie-now-50-is-on-a-mission-and
-advocates-girl-power; I Can Be . . . , BARBIE, http://icanbe.barbie.com/en_us/
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hand, the doll may be seen as lacking anatomical normality,
promoting consumerism, and at times offering images of girls
252
as unable to handle mathematics. A third corporation, Corporation C (CC), is a leading soda pop maker. It has promoted its
253
products as being all-American and “Classic.” It has also altered its ingredients over time. At one point, the soda had a lit254
tle cocaine in it. Later, CC switched from using sugar as a
255
sweetener to corn syrup. In addition, CC has issued reports
256
on its commitment to sustainability.
Now, suppose that someone criticized any of these corporations by making broad claims regarding their practices, the
honesty of their assertions, their role in culture, and so on. The
critic used print, the Internet, and local radio advertisements to
further the campaign. The critic also used the corporation’s
trademarks in the campaign—a practice sometimes compared
to hijacking—because they are the name and face of the corpo257
ration. In some cases, the critic may be using the marks in
advertisements for the critic’s products, such as when
SodaStream, a maker of do-it-yourself soft drink machines,
used Coke bottles and cans in a marketing campaign to highlight container waste and landfill created by soda makers’
258
products. Comparative advertising parodies are another possibility. In Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., MTD animated
Deere’s mark so that it was smaller than the original mark and

index.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (offering a range of Barbies with different careers and promoting the idea that “Barbie lets you be anything you want
to be”).
252. See, e.g., Life in Plastic, ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 2002, at 20; Teen Talk
Barbie Turns Silent on Math, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1992, at D4.
253. See Desai, supra note 136, at 983.
254. See, e.g., Douglas H. Boucher, Cocaine and the Coca Plant, 41 BIOSCIENCE 72, 75 (1991) (noting Coca-Cola “contained a minute amount of cocaine”
in its original formula).
255. See, e.g., Desai, supra note 136, at 983.
256. See, e.g., The Coca-Cola Company Releases Sustainability Report,
CSRWIRE (Feb. 4, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/
31545-The-Coca-Cola-Company-Releases-Sustainability-Report.
257. Cf., e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The
Love That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 807–09 (2010) (giving examples of trademarks parodied in campaigns against major corporations).
258. See Duane D. Stanford, SodaStream Takes Marketing Tactic to CocaCola’s Hometown, BLOOMBERG (June 20, 2012, 4:12 PM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-20/sodastream-takes-marketing-tactic-to-coca
-cola-s-hometown.html.
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ran away. Criticism via a product is another option. In CocaCola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., the defendant offered a poster
styled like a Coca-Cola ad that read “Enjoy Cocaine” in contrast
260
to Coca-Cola’s “Enjoy Coca-Cola” mark, a commentary that
seems appropriate given that cocaine was once an ingredient in
the drink. Sometimes the commentary will be about a corporate
image and how its products shape society. For example, Barbie
was used in music and art to critique images of femininity and
261
consumer society.
The antibrand movement has reworked
brands to expose child labor (Old Navy), the dangers of cigarettes (Joe Camel), Dow Chemical’s inaction after the Bhopal
disaster, British Petroleum’s responsibility for the Gulf of Mex262
ico, and more. And suppose a given corporation threatened to
263
sue or sued the speaker. How would the issue turn out? Under current doctrine, the critic would face large costs and injunctions, and possibly need to reach an appellate court before
264
the speech was vindicated. Like the defendants in Deere and
Gemini, some defendants might lose after a long, expensive
battle, because, as described above, the inquiry focuses on the
incorrect questions about misappropriation of the mark and
confusion of consumers rather than whether the statements are
265
false and whether the issue is about a corporate public figure.
Under the proposed approach, a defendant would argue that
the corporations are public figures, and that they must meet
266
the actual malice standard under Sullivan.
The advantages here are two-fold. In determining whether
a plaintiff is a public figure, courts may use an evidentiary
267
hearing. That early determination allows a court to resolve
cases where actual malice is not at issue and saves considera-

259. 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (enjoining the advertisement at issue).
260. 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enjoining the printing, distribution, and sale of the poster at issue).
261. See supra notes 112–19 and accompanying text.
262. See Katyal, supra note 257, at 807–09.
263. See, e.g., Stanford, supra note 258 (noting that Coca-Cola sent ceaseand-desist letters to SodaStream alleging both trademark infringement and
violation of advertising laws).
264. See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 156, at 61–62, 62 nn.59–64 (explaining the obscurity of the relevant areas of trademark law and the substantial
costs produced by trademark litigation).
265. See supra Part II.B.
266. See supra Part III.A.
267. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2:121, at 2-150 (2d
ed. 2005).
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ble costs. If the plaintiff has not argued there was actual malice but only negligence, and the defendant cedes negligence,
and if all other elements are in place, the case turns on wheth269
er the plaintiff is a public figure. If the plaintiff is a public
270
figure, she loses; if not, she wins. The actual malice determination is subtler but has similar benefits. Actual malice re271
quires clear and convincing evidence. Under Sullivan, defendants do not have an immediate bonus regarding burden of
272
proof to prevent litigation costs. Rather, the higher standard
makes summary judgment a favored strategy, because plain273
tiffs have a difficult time overcoming that standard.
The
standard results in potentially early resolution and thus lower
274
costs. As such, a corporate public figure doctrine enables earlier determination of the speech issues.
An examination of what the public figure analysis for corporations would look like illustrates how the approach would
work and why it should increase the amount of information
about corporations rather than reduce it, as is the case today.
Corporations can qualify as either general- or limitedpurpose public figures. Under standard public figure doctrine,
the general-purpose public figure is the exception, and the lim275
ited-purpose figure status is more likely. Corporations, how276
ever, can fit into either category rather easily. Determining
whether the plaintiff is a public figure and what type of public

268. See id. at 2-150 to -151.
269. Id. at 2-150.
270. Id.
271. See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 267, § 12:74, at 12-80 (“The more nuanced
and proper understanding is that the substantive First Amendment standards
are themselves high, requiring ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of ‘actual malice,’ and summary judgment is ‘favored’ only to the extent that there inures in
this substantive standard a relatively difficult burden for plaintiffs to overcome.”).
272. See id. at 12-80.3 (“Herbert v. Lando also casts serious doubt on the
notion that the chilling effect of a long and expensive trial justifies a presumption in favor of summary judgment, at least to the extent that such a presumption exceeds the balance struck between the rights of publishers and defamation plaintiffs in New York Times v. Sullivan.”).
273. Id. at 12-80.
274. Id. But cf. Lidsky, supra note 71, at 915–18 (arguing that actual malice is easier to overcome for plaintiffs suing non-media speakers and offering
an opinion privilege to augment the defense).
275. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976) (quoting Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
276. Fetzer, supra note 2, at 84–85.
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figure, general- or limited-purpose, is a question of law. The
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has explained:
A person becomes a general purpose public figure only if he or she is a
well-known celebrity, his name a household word. Such persons have
knowingly relinquished their anonymity in return for fame, fortune,
or influence. They are frequently so famous that they may be able to
transfer their recognition and influence from one field to another. Thus, it is reasonable to attribute a public character to all aspects
278
of their lives.

If CA is Caterpillar; CB, Mattel; and CC, Coca-Cola, they quali279
fy as general-purpose public figures quite well. Although corporations are not giving up anonymity, they seek and, in these
280
examples, attain “fame, fortune, and influence.”
An additional way to analyze the issue is to ask whether
the corporations’ marks would qualify for federal dilution protection. As explained above, dilution protects famous marks of
corporations with much the same levels of “fame, fortune, and
influence,” and the same ability “to transfer their recognition
and influence from one field to another” as human public fig281
ures.
If a corporation has a viable dilution claim, courts
should find that the corporation is also a general-purpose pub282
lic figure.
Even if one chooses to avoid declaring a famous corporation
a general-purpose public figure, or if CA, CB, and CC were not
Caterpillar, Mattel, and Coca-Cola, but instead were local corporations, they may often be limited-purpose public figures.
Courts have applied a three-part test to determine whether
283
someone is a limited-purpose public figure. First, the controversy must be determined “because the scope of the controversy
in which the plaintiff involves himself defines the scope of the
277. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc);
see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966) (“[I]t is for the trial judge in
the first instance to determine whether the proofs show respondent to be a
‘public official.’”).
278. Piro, 817 F.2d at 772 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
279. See 1 SACK, supra note 240, § 5:3.7, at 5-46 to -47.
280. See id. (explaining that the nature of being a public corporation and
“go[ing] public” is a voluntary action leading to mandatory public scrutiny, and
thus concluding that treating public corporations as public figures is consistent with the First Amendment and SEC laws).
281. See supra notes 143–54 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 143–54 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Piro, 817 F.2d at 772–73; Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns,
Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296–98 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., 818 F.2d 431, 433–34 (5th Cir. 1987) (adopting the test).
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public personality.” The issue must be public such that “persons actually [are] discussing it” and must affect more people
285
than just the ones directly involved in it. Criticisms about
CA’s approach to the environment, CB’s approach to women’s
place in society, or CC’s approach to health are issues people
discuss in the news, on blogs, and elsewhere. They also reach
more than the disputants. For these examples, the first prong
would be met.
Second, the plaintiff must have more than a “trivial or tan286
gential” role in the controversy. Whether the role was more
than trivial will turn on whether the corporations asserted
some influence on outcomes or made statements about the is287
sues at hand. In our examples, Caterpillar, Mattel, and CocaCola have all taken public stands by touting their roles in sus288
289
tainability, empowering girls and women, and health mat290
ters. So even if not deemed general-purpose corporate figures,
they would meet this part of the evaluation. If, however, a corporation of any size—national, state, or local—has not made
statements on an issue, would it still be a limited-purpose public figure? Answering that question would require investigation
of facts about lobbying, public relation campaigns, and similar
291
acts that demonstrate the role of the company. It does not

284. Piro, 817 F.2d at 772.
285. Id. (quoting Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297).
286. Id. at 773 (quoting Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297).
287. See, e.g., id. at 773–74 (describing the statements made by the plaintiff regarding public policy toward the oil industry, and the influence plaintiff
exercised as the head of Mobil).
288. See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., Global Issues:
Engaging with Government, CATERPILLAR, http://www.caterpillar.com/
cda/components/fullArticle?m=484235&x=7&id=3449560 (last visited Nov. 2,
2013) (stating Caterpillar’s commitment to political advocacy on its own behalf).
289. See supra notes 251–52 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., MATTEL,
PLAYING RESPONSIBLY: 2009 GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP REPORT 40 (2009), available
at http://corporate.mattel.com/about-us/2009GCReport.pdf (listing learning,
health, girl empowerment, and joy as Mattel’s publicly advocated philanthropic priorities).
290. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., 2011/2012
Sustainability Report, COCA-COLA (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.coca
-colacompany.com/sustainabilityreport/ (providing links to, among other
things, pages detailing Coca-Cola’s public commitments to fighting obesity,
increasing nutrition education, and more).
291. Cf. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 267, § 2:32, at 2-51 (“No magical number of
media appearances is required to render a citizen a public figure . . . . The
court must ask whether a reasonable person would have concluded that the
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take much for a corporation’s acts to make it a limited-purpose
public figure. The question turns on whether the corporation’s
292
activity could foreseeably generate public attention. A corporation’s local interactions, activities, and policies, such as community-development projects, advocacy on city and county
councils, negotiated tax breaks, employment policies, and so on,
would favor treating even a somewhat unknown corporation as
293
a limited public figure. One might wish to say that the corporation did not seek the limelight but, like a person, a corpora294
tion cannot say it did not want the attention.
Last, the germaneness question would follow a similar fact
inquiry, but a corporation’s greater general power to shape policy as compared to an individual indicates that many issues
could be germane more often than expected. The issue must be
295
“germane to the plaintiff’s participation in the controversy.”
If the statements about the corporation were about the issues
on which it spoke or where it had influence, they would, of
296
course, be germane. A broad claim that Mattel supports war
or Coca-Cola hates same-sex marriage rights or Caterpillar dislikes NASA’s space program would not seem to be germane. For
human defamation plaintiffs, courts will not allow a private
person to be deemed a limited-purpose public figure unless the
statement has some connection to the controversy, and
“[m]isstatements wholly unrelated to the controversy” are not
297
protected. But claims that selling goods from or investing in
former apartheid South Africa supported racism helped change
policy at both the corporate and state level, which in turn sped
298
the decline of that regime.
plaintiff would play or was seeking to play a major role in determining the
outcome of the controversy.”).
292. See id. at 2-51 to -52.
293. See, e.g., Chafoulias v. Peterson, 668 N.W.2d 642, 654 (Minn. 2003),
reh’g granted, 668 N.W.2d 642, 666–67 (Minn. 2003) (“By seeking public and
government support for development projects that have a significant impact
on Rochester, [defendant] has assumed a position that invites attention and
comment about the manner in which he conducts his business affairs.”).
294. See id.; cf. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 267, § 2:32, at 2-51 (“It is no answer
to the assertion that one is a public figure to say, truthfully, that one does not
choose to be.”).
295. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(quoting Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
296. See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1298 (holding that the statements made
must be related to “plaintiff’s participation in the controversy”).
297. Id.
298. See Jennifer Frankel, The Legal and Regulatory Climate for Invest-
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The recent Chick-fil-A gay rights debate illustrates how
quickly a topic can become germane. The President of Chick-filA was quoted as saying “he endorses ‘the biblical definition of
299
the family unit.’” The issue quickly turned into an indictment
of the company in general. Some mayors claimed they would
300
not allow the restaurant to open in their cities. Other political candidates urged people to eat more Chick-fil-A to show
301
support for the company’s president and his family. Although
the president seemed to separate his beliefs from how he ran
his workplace, some argued that because he made money from
the restaurants, and then he and the company donated to conservative financial groups that oppose gay rights, protesting
302
and boycotting Chick-fil-A would help gay rights. The examples and the process issues discussed above show that corporations are influencing public policy, and consumers are asked to
vote with their dollars as a way to support or protest a given
policy. Thus, a claim that failing to offer same-sex rights in the
workplace undermines LGBT rights or choosing to offer such
rights undermines family values could be germane as a general
matter. As another example, after Google, Nabisco, and J. C.
Penney chose to support gay and lesbian rights, they faced
some consumer backlash and received some consumer sup303
port. Thus, one might argue that any large company that
employs many people ought to support or reject gay rights. Inment in Post-apartheid South Africa: An Historical Overview, 6 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 189–90 n.40, 191–94 (1998) (describing a “code of conduct” for American companies operating in South Africa that required equal
treatment for and desegregation of black employees and included the general
exhortation to “[w]ork to eliminate laws and customs which impeded social
and political justice [and] [s]upport the ending of all apartheid laws”).
299. See Mark Oppenheimer, Few Resist the Temptation to Opine on Chickfil-A, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2012, at A15.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See Bill Barrow, More Than Gay Marriage Driving Chick-fil-A Flap,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 4, 2012, http://www.mercurynews.com/top
-stories/ci_21233680/more-than-gay-marriage-driving-chick-fil-flap.
303. See, e.g., American Family Association Calls for Boycott of Google over
Company’s Support of LGBT Rights, HUFFINGTON POST (July 12, 2012, 1:45
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/11/american-family-association
-google-video_n_1666218.html; Kevin Burra & Curtis M. Wong, Oreo Cookies’
Gay Pride Backlash: 25 Companies and Products Boycotted for Supporting
LGBT Rights, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/28/oreo-backlash-companies-anti-gay-boycott_n_
1634767.html; Heba Hasan, Anti-Gay Group Slams JCPenney over Father’s
Day Ad, TIME, June 3, 2012, http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/06/03/anti-gay
-group-slams-jcpenneys-over-fathers-day-ad/.
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deed, the Chick-fil-A controversy resulted in a commitment not
304
to support and donate to anti-gay groups. Inquiring into a
corporation’s social policies is just as germane as inquiring into
305
a public official’s social policies. The topics become germane
as a corporation chooses its policy for such matters and participates in controversy when it makes such decisions. The way in
which a corporation makes its goods, offers it services, and runs
its business are analogous to a public official’s fitness-for-office
question—just as our commercial decisions are analogous to
306
our political decisions.
Corporations can wield enough power that they often influence and alter the course of human events at the international,
national, state, and local level. Determining what is germane is
difficult, because corporations have burst the bounds of the limited commercial actor. As corporations’ importance increases
and we are asked to use the market to express and support political ideas, many issues could be deemed germane. In sum,
whether a corporation is a limited-purpose public figure should
be a broad, lenient inquiry. The increased deference to corporate speech and the reasons supporting such increased power to
speak push the corporation into the public figure realm and
lead to the need for an increased ability to question the corporation.
Under Citizens United, however, corporations have the
307
same speech rights as people. Thus, corporations will be able
308
to assert claims about other corporations. In such a world,
corporations will have to engage in lawsuits or even more
spending for counter-speech, i.e., more advertising, as they

304. See Tiffany Hsu, Chick-fil-A Vows to Stop Donating to Anti-Gay
Groups, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/19/
business/la-fi-chick-fil-a-gay-20120920.
305. An inquiry into public officials’ fitness for office makes comments
about dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation germane. See
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1298 n.33 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Moniter Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 273 (1971); cf. Tavoulareas v.
Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that issues of nepotism at the corporate management level are germane).
306. Compare supra note 305 and accompanying text, with supra notes
301–02 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s desire to have corporations participate in “the public debate”).
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launch broad claims about each other. These activities are
arguably already part of our media and advertising land310
scape. Consumers and activists may also hurl broad claims
311
about a corporation into the fray. As such, consumers will
have to sort an ever-increasing stack of information and must
312
be able to parse that information to use it. That result maps
to the world of deference to speech by all speakers and reliance
313
on counter-speech that the Supreme Court has embraced.
Put differently, the world of centralized information
314
sources is no longer our world. With the advent of blogs, ratings sites, and social media reviews, consumers look to a range
315
of speech sources to determine the truth.
With greater
sources of information and lower costs to find it, the law has
perhaps moved to an all-out information war model rather than
316
one with paternal notions of centralized information sources.
The Supreme Court’s preference for increased speech by all,
and its embrace of information technology and counter-speech
to correct a false claim instead of banning the speech, points to
a new world where all speak, and it is believed that the mixing
and mashing of ideas will allow the best answers to arise to

309. Cf. Lidsky, supra note 71, at 909–10 (“[M]any publicly held corporations can even finance intensive media campaigns to rehabilitate a damaged
corporate reputation.”).
310. See, e.g., Jeanine Poggi, CBS and Time Warner Cable’s Smear Campaigns Could Backfire, ADVERTISING AGE (July 29, 2013), http://adage.com/
article/media/cbs-time-warner-cable-smear-campaigns-backfire/243341/.
311. Cf., e.g., Matt DeLong, Google: ‘Legalize Love’ Campaign Isn’t About
Gay Marriage, WASH. POST, July 8, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/innovations/post/google-legalize-love-campaign-isnt-about-gay-marriage/
2012/07/08/gJQAN3PQWW_blog.html (describing the misinterpretation of
Google’s Legalize Love campaign, which is not intended to support gay marriage, but rather to “support[] workers in countries that criminalize homosexuality”).
312. Cf. supra note 142 (discussing the level of competence and rationality
that consumers, as an audience, are presumed to have).
313. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
314. See Balkin, supra note 13, at 33.
315. See id. at 11 (discussing blogs and amateur media criticism sites,
among other things, as complements to traditional mass media).
316. See BRUCE BIMBER, INFORMATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 21–23
(2003) (arguing that the United States is in a fourth information revolution,
one characterized by information abundance, where decentralized actors make
political decisions, rather than one where the government and a few large organizations drive the process from a central point).
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317

correct falsehoods and lead our decisions. If so, and if corporations are to have even greater power to speak, we must protect the ability for such a distributed marketplace of ideas and
information to function. Right now, corporations can speak
more than ever before, maintain privileges as central sources of
information about themselves, and wield great power to sup318
press speech about their affairs. Applying a corporate public
figure doctrine to corporate reputation law enables all to participate in the marketplace of ideas. Failing to do so upsets the
balance required to ensure that all information is shared and
available to society, not just one side’s view.
CONCLUSION
Free speech law is unbalanced. In Citizens United the Supreme Court embraced corporate speech rights about politics.
In Sorrell, the Court further championed a corporation’s right
to speak about commerce. A commitment to having more
sources of information available to individuals and society as
they make decisions underlies part of the Court’s justifications
for these decisions. But the role of corporations in society was
an important aspect of the decisions as well. Corporations are
indeed important actors in society. As the Court has said, corporations are key parts of our politics and economy. Corporate
policies about labor, the environment, gay rights, and more
shape our society and the options for how we live. As society
moves to an ever-increasing reliance on the market and private
provision of goods, corporations become all the more important
for political matters. Consumers and corporations now lobby
the market and society about what to buy based on social and
political reasons as much as, if not more than, pure price and
quality pleas. Corporate rights to do so are clear; others’ rights
to question and offer counter-speech to corporate claims are
not. When consumers or other groups question a corporation,
corporations can and do use corporate reputation laws to prevent such speech. Corporations thus have increased speech
rights while speech about them is unduly limited. This mistake
can be cured once we understand that if corporations have
speech rights like people, corporations must be treated like the
people to whom they are often most similar: public figures.
317. Cf. POST, supra note 55, at 36–37 (arguing that the ability to partake
in public debate trumps the interest in limiting speech to educate the public
with perfectly accurate information).
318. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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Reordering free speech law to recognize corporate public
figures would meet its core goals: increasing the overall amount
of information in the marketplace and preventing a public figure from using reputation laws to squelch speech about them.
Once that is done, corporations will be like people—able to lobby, persuade, advertise, and engage in politics, and open to the
same scrutiny as any other person who does likewise.

